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NOTE RE: PARTIES
The undersigned counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants represents that the parties
named in the caption have been the only parties to this litigation. PlaintiffsAppellants, Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, have settled their claims
against former defendants Omni Products, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad Company, and
Utah Transit Authority. Those entities are no longer parties to this litigation. The only
remaining defendants and the only true appellees are Salt Lake City Southern Railroad
Company, Inc. and Salt Lake City Corporation.
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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is on appeal from a directed verdict and other rulings in favor of
defendant-appellee Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ("Southern"), and
from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-appellee Salt Lake City
Corporation ("the City"), and from a judgment and final order, with all rulings having
been made by, and with all orders and the judgment having been entered by, the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley). The
District Court entered its order formally dismissing the Goebels' claims against the
City on July 8, 2002. It entered Judgment in favor of Southern (the last defendant
against which the claims of Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, the plaintiffsappellants, were resolved at the District Court level) on August 29, 2002. It denied the
Goebels' Motion for New Trial on September 24, 2002. The Goebels filed their
Notice of Appeal, in the District Court, in timely fashion, on September 27, 2002.
This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Issue No. 1. Whether, in this most substantial personal injury and loss-ofconsortium case, the District Court (having denied Southern's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the evidence pertinent to the issue having come in at trial as it had been
developed at the summary judgment stage) committed reversible error when, in the
face of direct evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and in the
1
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face of settled Utah law, it granted Southern's motion for directed verdict on the basis
that Southern had no actual or constructive notice or reasonable opportunity to cure a
dangerous condition at the subject railroad crossing.
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a
correction-of-error standard (as purely a question of law). The legal standard for
granting a directed verdict is essentially the same as that for the granting of summary
judgment. The evidence must be examined in the light most favorable to the Goebels.
If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom
that would support a judgment in favor of the Goebels, the directed verdict must be
reversed. Management Committee of Gravstone Pine Homeowners Ass'n v.
Gravstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). The directed verdict will be
sustained on appeal only if the evidence was such that reasonable people could not
arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1973).

{

No deference is given to the trial court's decision.
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' having resisted, at oral argument (R.
6760, Tr. 9-24; 28-33), Southern's motion for directed verdict; by the District Court's
bench ruling (R. 6761, Tr. 1246-51) granting that motion; and by the District Court's
Order Regarding Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.'s Duty to Plaintiffs
and Granting Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.'s Motion for Directed
Verdict ("Directed Verdict Order"). R. 6668-72.
2
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<

Issue No. 2. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in ruling
that the Goebels could not pursue non-public nuisance claims under Utah Code Ann.
§56-1-11 on the basis that such claims would be superfluous to the Goebels'
negligence claims, although that statute does not require a plaintiff to prove a
defendant's actual or constructive notice of an unsafe condition at a railroad crossing.
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a
correction-of-error standard. The proper interpretation of a statute is purely a question
of law. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Equitable
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993). No deference is
given to the trial court's decision.
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' filing their Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint (R. 124-48); by their memorandum in support of that
motion (R. 149-51); by their reply memorandum in support of that motion (R. 191201); by oral argument (not transcribed) (R. 237); and by the District Court's Order on
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (R. 363-69), which
expressly stated (R. 364) that the Goebels could not pursue negligence-related claims
under §56-1-11, on the basis that such claims would be "superfluous and would add
nothing to plaintiffs'claims."

3
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Issue No. 3. Whether the District Court erred2 in determining, in the face of
contractual language and in the face of principles recognized in the Restatement,
Second of Torts, §324A, that Southern owed the Goebels no duty of care under its
contract with the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA").
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a
correction-of-error standard (as purely a question of law). A trial court's interpretation
of a contract is accorded no deference and is reviewed for correctness. Aguagen Int'L
Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). No deference is given a trial
court's interpretation and application of the common law. E.g., Trujillo v. Jenkins,
840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' submission of their Memorandum in
Opposition to Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3016-3101, at 3071-72;
3079-80; by the District Court's bench ruling (R. 6760, Tr. 1246), made in the
procedural context of Southern's motion for directed verdict; and by the Directed
Verdict Order. R. 6669.
Issue No. 4. Whether the District Court committed error in determining that

2

Given the fact that the District Court determined that Southern owed the Goebels
duties of care under other legal concepts, the ruling referenced in this issue was not a
basis for the District Court's granting Southern's motion for directed verdict, but, in
the new trial to be held, it is an issue that will come up again and should be addressed
by the Court at this time. For the same reason, the Court should, in this Appeal,
address Issues Nos. 4 and 5.
4
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the subject contract between Southern and UTA was ambiguous and in excluding
extrinsic evidence regarding that contract.
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a
correction-of-error standard (as purely a question of law). Whether contract language
is ambiguous is a question of law. Dixon v. Pro-Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah
1999). If a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the intent
of the parties. Id. No deference is given to the trial court's decision.
This issue was preserved by oral argument (R. 6764, Tr. 545-56); by attempted
questioning of UTA executive Crosby Mecham (R. 6764, Tr. 576-79); by further oral
argument (R. 6765, Tr. 587-94); by proffering proposed trial exhibits P-53, P-54, P-46,
and P-47 (R. 6765, Tr. 592; 603-04); by the District Court's bench ruling that he
contract in question was clear and unambiguous (R. 6765, Tr. 598); and by proffering
Mr. Mecham's testimony (R. 6765, Tr. 598-99).
Issue No. 5. Whether the District Court committed error in excluding evidence
of the Goebels' liability expert's empirical testing done in connection with his accident
reconstruction work.
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to
be one of abuse of discretion. E.g., Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah
2000).

5
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This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by attempted
questioning of that witness, oral argument, proffer of that witness's testimony, and the
District Court's ruling (R. 6766, Tr. 840-49); and by proffer of exhibits (enlargements
of photographs) pertaining to that testimony. R. 6767, Tr. 1212-13.
Issue No. 6. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in granting
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, which ruling was predicated on the
proposition that the 1998 amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act, regarding
recipients of notices of claims, should be applied retroactively.
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to the question of
whether a statutory charge should be deemed to apply retroactively is a correction-oferror standard (as purely a question of law). Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997); Brown & Root Indus. Serv.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997). No deference is given to the
trial court's decision.
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' filing their Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3798-3919 (see especially
R. 3806-08)); at oral argument (held June 4, 2002) on that Motion (the proceedings of
that hearing have not been transcribed); by the District Court's bench ruling (R. 6759,
Tr. 6-7) granting that Motion; and by the District Court's entry of its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 5773-80.
*
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III.

STATUTES AND ORDINANCE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL

• Utah Code Ann. $10-7-26(2)
• Utah Code Ann. §10-7-29
• Salt Lake City Ordinance §14.44.030
• Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11
• Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11
• Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13
Please see pages 001-003 of the Addendum hereto for language of the statutes
and ordinance.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF PROCEEDING.

This Appeal is from rulings, orders, and a judgment in this negligence/personal
injury/loss-of-consortium action. The Goebels settled with three parties (Omni
Products, Inc. ("Omni"), Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), and
UTA), prior to trial. The District Court granted a motion for directed verdict, at the
close of all the evidence, in favor of one of the appellees, Southern. The District Court
had earlier ruled that the Goebels could not pursue, under Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11,
claims other than public nuisance claims. The District Court also granted summary
judgment in favor of the other appellee, the City. This Appeal is primarily from those
three rulings. The Goebels also appeal, for purposes of the new trial to be held herein,
from certain additional rulings (discussed in Issues Nos. 3, 4, and 5, at pages 4-6,
above).
7
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B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORY OF
PROCEEDINGS.

On February 19, 1998, Mr. Goebel sustained a "terrible"3 spinal cord injury in a
bicycle accident. He had been riding his road bicycle westbound on 1700 South Street
in Salt Lake City. He somersaulted and landed on his helmeted head while he was in
the process of traversing the railroad crossing at approximately 200 West. The front
wheel of his bicycle entered a gap, essentially parallel with the direction he was
traveling, that ran between two adjacent pads of the rubber crossing surface that was
then in place. E.g., R. 6766, Tr. 864-65.
The gap appears in the lower part of the two "videograbs" (still images from a
videotape) enlarged versions of which comprise Ex. P-10. That videotape (Ex. P-12)
was taken on March 14, 1998. A reduced-size version of Ex. P-10 appears in the
Addendum hereto at 077.
If he had not had to avoid a hump or "protuberance" (Mr. Goebel's term) that
extended to within two feet of the outermost rail at the crossing, the bicycle wheel

3

This is the characterization used by Southern's counsel in his opening statement. R.
6762, Tr. 43. Mr. Goebel's stipulated medical expenses were, at the time of trial,
$211,161.36. R. 6762, Tr. 94-95. The nature of his injury and some of his problems
were explained by, among others, Dr. Jeff Randle, one of his treating physicians. R.
6763, Tr. 248-85. Some of the effects the injury have had on him and his relationship
with his wife, plaintiff-appellant Kathy Goebel, are explained in Ms. Goebel's
testimony. R. 6767, Tr. 1122-1161. His economic loss expert testified (R. 6764, Tr.
529) that the trial-time present value of Mr. Goebel's economic damages alone
substantially exceeded 2 million dollars.
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would have had no occasion to enter the gap. R. 6765, Tr. 661.
The rubber crossing pads had been manufactured by a predecessor of Omni.
The pads had been installed by Union Pacific. The rail line and crossing were owned
by UTA. The street on which Mr. Goebel had been traveling was owned and, beyond
two feet from the outermost rails at the crossing, maintained by defendant-appellee the
City. Defendant-appellee Southern had entered into an Administration and
Coordination Agreement ("the Agreement") with UTA (Ex. P-44); was in possession
of the subject railroad crossing pursuant to an easement agreement with Union Pacific
(E. P-45; R. 6767, Tr. 1119-20); was the only entity running trains over the crossing at
the time of the subject incident; was, under Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 and Salt Lake
City Ordinance §14.44.030, responsible for the safe condition of the crossing surface;
and was, pursuant to Utah statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-26(2) and -29),
responsible for the safe condition of the surface of the roadway up to points that
extended two feet from the outermost rails at the crossing.
On September 9, 1999, the Goebels filed their Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint (R. 124-48), along with a supporting memorandum (R. 149-51).
Southern resisted that Motion by memorandum. R. 167-84. The Goebels sought, in a
reply memorandum (R. 191-201), and at oral argument (not transcribed) (R. 237), to
convince the District Court that they should be allowed to assert claims based on Utah
Code Ann. §56-1-11. That statute provides:
9
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Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road.
The District Court ruled (R. 364) that the Goebels could not pursue non-public
nuisance claim based on that statutory language for the reason that such claims would
be superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence claims.
On May 15, 2000, the Goebels filed their Second Amended Complaint (R. 52041), which included public nuisance (R. 537-38) as well as negligence claims against
all defendants.
In or about March 2001, the Goebels settled their claims against Omni. The
Order of Dismissal of those claims was entered April 9, 2001. R. 811-13.
On June 4, 2002, the District Court heard oral argument on the Motions for
Summary Judgment filed by the defendants (Southern, Union Pacific, UTA, and the
City) that were then still in the case. On or about June 14, 2002 (R. 6759, Tr. 3-7), the
District Court announced its rulings (formalized at 6497-6500) denying all Motions for
Summary Judgment except that filed by the City. In granting the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the District Court determined that the current version of Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-12(3)(b)(ii)(A), which went into effect on May 4, 1998 (2 Vi
months after the date the Goebels5 claims arose), was the controlling version, that it
should be applied retroactively, and that the Goebels' service of the notice of claim on
the City's mayor and council members (done pursuant to the versions of Utah Code
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Ann. §§63-30-11 and 63-30-13 that were in effect as of the date that the Goebels'
claims arose) was defective.
After the District Court denied Union Pacific's and UTA's Motions for
Summary Judgment, the Goebels settled their claims against those defendants. The
orders of dismissal of those claims were entered on August 2, 2002 (R. 6503-04) and
July 29, 2002. R. 6489-91.
The Goebels' claims against Southern, the Goebels' target defendant, were tried
in July of 2002. On July 17 , at the close of all the evidence, Southern (having
preserved, on the record {e.g., R. 6767, Tr. 1161-62), its procedural right to make such
a motion) moved for a directed verdict. R. 6760, Tr. 7.
After oral argument (R. 6760, Tr. 7-33) the District Court took that motion
under advisement and, on the morning of July 18 , orally granted that motion. R.
6761, Tr. 1246-53. The District Court's ruling was based on its determination, with
respect both to the Goebels' common law negligence claim and their public nuisance
claim, that the Goebels had not produced evidence that Southern knew or should have
known of the dangerous condition of the crossing or that Southern had a reasonable
opportunity to cure that dangerous condition.4 The District Court, being of the

4

The District Court also determined (R. 6761, Tr. 3-5), in announcing its ruling on
Southern's motion for directed verdict, that Southern owed the Goebels a duty of care
under certain Utah statutory provisions and a Salt Lake City ordinance (set forth at
pages 001-003 of the Addendum) and by reason of Southern's easement with Union
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expressed view that the standard for summary judgment was different from the
standard for directed verdict (R. 6760, Tr. 22), took that action although the evidence
on that aspect of the case came in at trial as it had been developed at the time of the
summary judgment proceedings, and although the District Court had denied
Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment on the notice and opportunity to cure basis
as well as on all of the numerous other bases advanced by Southern.5
The Goebels filed their Motion for New Trial (R. 6453-54), under Rule 59(a)(7)
("error in law") of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and supporting memorandum
(R. 6457-66) on July 22, 2002. On August 29, 2002, the District Court signed its
Directed Verdict Order (R. 6668-72) and, on that same day, entered Judgment in favor
of Southern. R. 6673-74. On September 24, 2002, the District Court entered its Order
Denying the Goebels5 Motion for New Trial. R. 6729-30.
This Appeal ensued, with the Goebels' Notice of Appeal having been filed, in

Pacific ("the Easement"), but that Southern owed the Goebels no duty under the
Agreement between Southern and UTA.
5

The District Court did not dispute the proposition, advanced by the Goebels (R. 6760,
Tr. 9) in their argument in opposition to Southern's motion for directed verdict, that
the evidence came in as it was projected to come in at the summary judgment stage (in
the course of denying Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court
had observed that there were triable questions of fact on the actual or constructive
notice and reasonable opportunity to cure aspects of the Goebels' case against
Southern (R. 6759, Tr. 4)). The District Court expressly ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 10; R.
6671) that Southern was not entitled to directed verdict on any of the other grounds it
had advanced.
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the District Court, in timely fashion (with respect to both the Judgment and the Order
Denying Motion for New Trial), on September 27, 2002. R. 6731-33.
V.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

THE DIRECTED VERDICT.

The evidence came in the way it was poised to come in at the summary
judgment stage. The District Court committed reversible error when it granted
Southern's motion for directed verdict in the face of substantial evidence, and
inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom, supporting their claims against Southern. The
Goebels should clearly be allowed to present their claims against Southern to a new
jury.
2.

UTAH CODE ANN. §56-1-11.

The District Court erroneously, by prohibiting the Goebels from pursuing a
non-public nuisance claim based on Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 (which makes railroad
companies liable for their "neglect" in failing to "make and maintain good and
sufficient crossings"), kept the Goebels from being able effectively to argue that
Southern's notice, actual or constructive, of dangerous conditions at the crossing, was
not a prerequisite of the success of their case against Southern. The Court should,
especially if (but not only if) it rejects, for whatever reason, the Goebels' argument
that the District Court committed reversible error in granting Southern's motion for
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directed verdict, reverse the District Court's §56-1-11 ruling and allow the Goebels to
pursue, in the new trial, their claim founded on that statute.
3.

DUTY UNDER THE SOUTHERN-UTA AGREEMENT AND
§324A.

The Court should rule, based on the clear language of the Agreement (Ex. P-44)
between Southern and UTA (appended hereto at 043-76; see especially Sections 3.1
and 3.3, at pages 050-51 of the Addendum), that Southern contractually undertook the
duty to maintain the subject crossing area and that, pursuant to Restatement, Second,
of Torts, §324A, that duty ran to the Goebels. The District Court should be ordered to
allow the Goebels to present that theory of liability to the jury in the new trial.
4.

AMBIGUITY OF THE CONTRACT.

In the event that the Court rejects the Goebels' primary contention with respect
to the Agreement between Southern and UTA (that it clearly and unequivocally
imposes on Southern a duty to maintain the crossing for the safe use of those,
including bicyclists, who cross the tracks perpendicular to the direction of the rails),
the Court should rule that that Agreement is ambiguous and should, accordingly, allow
extrinsic evidence, including course of conduct and contract interpretation, by those
familiar with the genesis of that contract and its administration, to be presented to the
jury in the new trial.
5.

EMPIRICAL TESTING EVIDENCE.

The District Court abused is discretion in ruling that the Goebels5 accident
14
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reconstruction expert could not explain to the jury, through oral testimony and the use
of photographs, the empirical testing he did to confirm the proposition that
Mr. Goebel's bicycle tire could have traveled into the gap between the rubber crossing
panels. The Court should instruct the District Court to allow such evidence in the new
trial.
6.

NON-RETRO ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY STATUTORY CHANGE.

The District Court should have determined that the change in law, which
required the Goebels to serve their notice of claim on the Salt Lake City Recorder,
rather than on the "governing body," is to be applied prospectively only. The District
Court's ruling was erroneous, may be contrary to precedent of this Court, and could
lead, by reason of principles of subject matter jurisdiction, to untenable results. This
Court is not bound by statute or any of its previous rulings to uphold the District
Court's ruling and should reverse that ruling and allow the Goebels to take their case
against the City to trial.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GRANTING SOUTHERN'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT.
1.

INTRODUCTION

At approximately 11:30 a.m., on Thursday, July 18, 2002, eight trial jurors and
two alternates emerged, unhappy and confused, into the Fourth Floor (West Wing)
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hallway of the Matheson Courthouse. They had just spent an hour and a half (see R.
6767, Tr. 1209; R. 6761, Tr. 12-13) being debriefed by the District Court trial judge
about their jury experience. They spent the next hour and a half discussing the case
with George and Kathy Goebel and their legal counsel, still trying to understand how
and why the directed verdict could have been lawful or just and how Utah law could
prevent them, after they had heard and seen what they had heard and seen in the
evidence, from being given the opportunity to award substantial damages to the
Goebels.
The prospective jurors came to court to fill out questionnaires on Monday,
July 8 . They were in Court all day Tuesday, July 9 , while the jury selection process
was being completed. They sat through six days of evidence. At the conclusion of all
the evidence, when all that was left to be done was settling on the jury instructions,
instructing the jury, arguments of counsel, and jury deliberations, the District Court
took the case from them.
The waste of judicial resources, the disappointment to the jurors (who labored
conscientiously throughout the trial and who looked forward, with enthusiasm, to
playing their roles in the administration of justice), the expense to the Goebels, and the
effort expended by counsel, by the District Court, and by the District Court's
personnel in the exercise of selecting the jury and trying the case are things that
probably cannot now be compensated in any meaningful way.
16
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The District Court was erroneously of the view that different standards govern
motions for summary judgment and motions for directed verdict. Especially given the
stage of the trial proceedings that had been reached, the District Court should, even if
it was inclined to grant that motion, have taken it under advisement and let the jury do
its job and then determine, if the verdict was in favor of the Goebels, whether to grant
that motion or a post-judgment motion brought by Southern under Rule 50(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Now, however, the Goebels face not only this Appeal
but another lengthy trial. Meanwhile, Mr. Goebel's health is, as a result of his
catastrophic spinal cord injury, which rendered him an "incomplete" quadriplegic,
further deteriorating. He has had additional surgery and he is enduring even greater
pain and disability than he was at the time of trial. This Court cannot undo all the
harm that the District Court's directed verdict ruling did to the Goebels, but it can and
should, regardless of how it handles the other issues in this Appeal, rule that the
District Court erred in granting Southern's motion for directed verdict, and decree that
a new trial be held as soon as possible.
For six separate reasons, any one of which will suffice for reversal, the District
Court committed reversible error in granting Southern's motion for directed verdict. A
discussion of those reasons follows.
2.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROTUBERANCE

The uncontroverted evidence was that the protuberance went right up to the
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easternmost surface of the crossing. R. 6765, Tr. 661-62, 697. The protuberance was
a foreseeable (e.g., R. 6065-70; 6095-96) roadway feature that Mr. Goebel had had to
avoid for over nine months (R. 6765, Tr. 655, 674), while it was in the same condition.
R. 6765, Tr. 655, 713-14. The surface of the crossing extended only 22 inches east
from the easternmost rail. (See Ex. P-58, an enlargement of a diagram (small copy
attached at 078 of the Addendum hereto) of the part of the crossing that included the
subject gap and parts of the westernmore pair of rails (R. 6765, Tr. 768-69; 784-88)
made by David Ingebretsen, the Goebels' liability expert, after it had been removed
from the scene. The rest of the crossing surface had been demolished by the time
Mr. Ingebretsen made that diagram. It is apparent, from a review of a videotape (Ex.
P-12) that was made on March 14, 1998, less than a month after the date of the
incident, and from a photo (Ex. D-4; small copy of the enlarged photograph is attached
at 079 of the Addendum hereto) taken before the crossing was removed in July or
August 1998, that the width of the panels around the eastemmore pair of rails (21 lA")
was the same width as those around the westernmore pair of rails (where the subject
gap was located) and that the distance from the rails to the panels is the same for the
westernmore pair of rails QA") as it is for the eastemmore pair. And there was, in any
event, oral testimony that those things appeared to be the same. R. 6765, Tr. 788-89.)
Accordingly, and pursuant to the "2-foot" rule set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§§10-7-26(2) and -29 (pertinent language of those statutes is set forth in the
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Addendum, at 001), Salt Lake Southern shared responsibility, with the City,6 for the
existence of and hazardous condition of that protuberance. The District Court
correctly ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 3-4; R. 6669) that Southern owed the Goebels duties of
care under those statutes. Southern, which had been operating over the tracks since
1993 (when the Agreement (Ex. P-44) and the Easement (Ex. P-45) were executed,
and which had been inspecting the tracks since at least January of 1998 (R.6065-68;
6166; 6175)), had, at least as a matter fit for jury determination, constructive notice of
the presence of the protuberance and had had such constructive notice for at least the
nine-month period that Mr. Goebel had been riding a bicycle to work and had been
observing and avoiding that protuberance. R. 6765, Tr. 661-65. The uncontroverted
testimony, from two City street department employees (R. 6763, Tr. 287-89; Tr. 296300), was that humps of any size in a roadway, like potholes of any size in the
roadway, present hazardous conditions, not only if they are contacted by users of the
roadway, including bicyclists, but also if, by reason of avoiding such hazards, users of
the roadway, including bicyclists, come into contact with other hazards. There can be
no doubt, at least as a matter fit for jury determination, that if Mr. Goebel had not had
to veer from his normal riding course (very close to the right of the "fog line" to the

6

Mr. Goebel testified that the protuberance, which went right up to the easternmost
part of the crossing surface (R. 6765, Tr. 662, 697) was 4 inches long, east to west (R.
6765, Tr. 662), meaning that it extended to a distance of 26 inches from the
easternmost rail. There was no contrary evidence.
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right of the roadway (R. 6765, Tr. 661)) to avoid the protuberance, the front wheel of
his new, more narrow-wheeled bicycle (he had ridden that bike only two or three
times) (R. 6765, Tr. 669-70) would have had no occasion to drop into the gap and he
would not have been injured. See, for a visual explanation, Ex. P-54, the scene
diagram made before the section of the crossing was removed. It shows the fog line
and the gap in question. A smaller version of that diagram appears in the Addendum
hereto at 080. The irregularly shaped oval, marked "Protuberance," has been drawn,
on the appended version, by the Goebels5 counsel, in an attempt to mimic what
Mr. Goebel drew on the actual exhibit. Mr. Goebel5s counsel has also written in, on
the appended version, "Fog Line" and "Subject Gap."
As the Goebels' counsel unsuccessfully sought to explain (R. 6760, Tr. 19-21;
28-32) to the District Court at the time Southern's motion for directed verdict was
being argued, it has never been essential to the Goebels' claim regarding the
protuberance (a stand-apart dangerous condition, and without which condition there is
no reason to think Mr. Goebel would have encountered the gap), that Southern had to
have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the gap. By way of
analogy, if, in the process of his avoiding the protuberance, Mr. Goebel had struck a
vehicle or a vehicle had struck him, Southern could still be held liable, as a matter of
triable fact, for the condition of the protuberance itself; and the vehicle strike could
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(analogous to the gap) be considered, as a matter of triable fact, another proximate
cause of his injury and damages.
Proximate cause is a factual issue which in most cases may not appropriately be
resolved as a matter of law. E.g., Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614,
615 (Utah 1985); Godeskv v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984);
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984). Utah law
recognizes a party's entitlement to have a jury decide a party's claim unless it appears
that, even upon the facts claimed by that party, he or she could not establish a basis for
recovery. Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). "[W]hen there is
doubt about the matter, it should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to
trial." Id. "[C]ourts should refuse to grant a directed verdict on issues of causation if
there is any evidence which might lead a reasonable jury to find a causal connection
between a breach and a subsequent injury." Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 938
(Utah 1999).
The District Court appears (R. 6761, Tr. 8-9; R. 6670) to have been of the
clearly erroneous view that there can be but one proximate cause of an accident and
that, here, that cause was the gap alone. The District Court erroneously invaded the
province of the jury when it (having expressed utterly no disagreement with the
proposition that Southern had constructive notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure
the condition of the protuberance) ruled that the protuberance, although it "may very
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well be a factor in this incident," was not a proximate cause of the accident. Id.
The District Court erred in taking the case from the jury. The long-standing
existence of the protuberance, Southern's duty to concern itself with the protuberance,
Mr. Goebel's having altered his path to avoid it, and the consequent travel of his
bicycle into the gap should, based on well-established Utah law, clearly have caused
the District Court to deny Southern's motion for directed verdict.
3.

SOUTHERN'S AFFIRMATIVE STATUTORY AND
ORDINANCE-BASED DUTIES

The District Court correctly ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 3-4), just prior to granting
Southern's motion for directed verdict, that Southern was a "railway company"
pursuant to Utah statutory and Salt Lake City ordinance law and owed the Goebels
legal duties pursuant to those safety laws. Those safety laws do not contemplate, as a
requirement for their violation, actual or even constructive notice of dangerous
conditions.
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-26(2) provides that every railway company must keep
every portion of every street used by it and upon or across which tracks are
constructed in good and safe condition for public travel.
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-29 provides that the tracks of all railway companies
when located upon the streets of a city shall be kept in repair and safe in all respects,
for the use of the traveling public.
Salt Lake City Ordinance §14.44.030 provides that every railway company
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operating within the boundaries of Salt Lake City shall keep every portion of every
street upon or across which its tracks are maintained in good and safe condition to
accommodate public travel.
As stated in McQuillin. Municipal Corporations §24.721: "Generally,
violations by a railroad of its duty under an ordinance with respect to crossing
constitutes, or at least gives evidence of, actionable negligence." That basic legal
precept is clearly applicable here. This Court, in a street railway negligence case,
Oswald v. Utah L.&R. Co.. 117 P. 46, 47 (Utah 1911), explained:
The law as provided by the ordinance prescribed some conduct for the
defendant. Courts have declared that the omission or commission of something
in violation of a valid statute, or of any ordinance reasonable in its terms, is
negligence, or evidence of negligence.
In cases in which statutes set forth affirmative duties for railroads and in cases in
which railroad duties are statutorily imposed, it is not necessary, for a railway
company to be found liable, that it have actual knowledge or a reasonable opportunity
to have obtained knowledge of an unsafe condition. E.g., York v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 56 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio App. 1943); Moreland v. Director-General 114 A. 424,425
(NJ. 1921); Louisville. N.A. & C.R. Co. v. Red. 47 111. App. 662, 664-65 (1893).
Although in Utah violation of a safety statute is not necessarily per se
negligence (see, e.g., MUJI 3.11), the principle, for purposes of this discussion (the
non-necessity of showing actual or constructive notice), is the same under Utah law.
See also MUJI 8.8, which is based on Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co.. 171 P. 999,1002
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(Utah 1918) and which provides (without mentioning a requirement of notice):
Railroad and railway companies have a duty to maintain good and sufficient
crossing surfaces. In other words, they must keep the crossing reasonably safe
for the traveling public to travel over, keeping in mind the location, whether in
a sparsely settled or populous locality, and the character and volume of traffic
that ordinarily may be expected to pass over the crossing.
The upshot of all this is that a showing of actual or constructive notice is not
required in a situation where an applicable statute or ordinance putting an affirmative
duty on a railway company is involved. It was error for the District Court, in these
circumstances, to direct a verdict based on Southern's supposed lack of actual or
constructive notice.
4.

SOUTHERN'S PRESUMED KNOWLEDGE OF THE
HAZARDOUS CONDITION OF THE GAP

Another basis for reversal, independent of those regarding the protuberance and
the statutes and ordinance discussed above is that, within the contemplation of
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1986), the condition of the
gap was "permanent." In other words, it was not a transitory or sudden condition

7

In Schnuphase, the Utah Supreme Court explained:
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent
nature, such as: in the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in
equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was created or chosen
by the defendant (or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such
circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, oris
responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof
of notice is necessary.
918 P.2d at 478 (emphasis added).
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such as the presence of snow or ice on a sidewalk, or the presence of a jalapeno, a
kiwi, or any other "foreign substance" on the floor of a supermarket, or street lights
going out. The evidence at trial was that gaps between rubber crossing panels develop
and enlarge predictably (but not infinitely) over time, rather than going from being
non-existent one day and 3A inch wide (the approximate size of the subject gap (e.g., R.
6762, Tr. 180)) the next day. E.g., R. 6065-70; 6115; 6200; 6204-05. (There was also
evidence, from Omni's Ron Nutting, a most knowledgeable man, that such gaps
"stabilize" in size (R. 6065-70; 6115); that he has seen no gaps bigger than 3A inch (R.
6065-70; 6094; 6117) and that gaps 3A inch wide present foreseeable hazards to
bicyclists. R. 6065; 6104-05.)
At least as a matter of triable fact, the jury should have been allowed to
consider the conduct of Southern, an entity (in the words of Schnuphase),
"responsible" for the condition of the surface of the crossing, in not only failing to
observe and correct the size of the gap once it reached a size large enough to
accommodate a bicycle wheel, but also in allowing it to get to such a critical size in the
first place. This situation is analogous to that of a building owner that allows rot in a
structure to reach a critical point where it becomes dangerous. Like rot, enlargement
of gaps is, as explained above, a progressive (although the gap size will ultimately
"stabilize"), not sudden, process. With respect to one "responsible" for a "permanent"
condition, such as building structures and gaps, there is no reason that the duty of
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reasonable care should be held to begin only when that condition has already reached a
critically dangerous point.
Southern can be held liable, at least as a matter of triable fact, for its abject
failure to have acted on the gap, in one fashion or another, before it got critically wide,
by either filling the gap (see, e.g., R. 6065-70; 6109-10) or removing and reinstalling
some of the rubber pads {e.g., R. 6065-68; 6200; 6209). This duty exists apart from its
duty to remedy the problem promptly after it had reached critical size.
In Gilton v. Hestonville M & F.P.R. Co.. 31 Atl. 249, 250 (Pa. 1895), a most
instructive case that squarely supports the Goebels' contention for application of the
"permanent condition" rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in the course of
i

reversing a "nonsuit" entered by the trial court on the basis that the defendant railroad
company did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition:
The defect in the rail did not occur suddenly or from an unusual or accidental
cause; it was the result of ordinary and long-continued use; it was apparent and
the danger from it probable. ... [The railroad company] was bound to know
that use and that climatic influences would produce defects in the rails .... The
defects in the rail in question did not arise in a day, nor probably in a week or a
month. The certainty that they would arise in time imposed the duty of
continued vigilance.

,

{

The District Court erred in rejecting the Goebels' argument regarding the
"permanent" nature of the gap hazard. This Court should determine that the hazard

<

was "permanent" and should rule, accordingly, that the Goebels did not need to prove
Southern's actual or constructive notice of that hazard to carry their case to the jury.
i
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5.

SOUTHERN'S CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE
DANGEROUS NATURE OF THE GAP ONCE IT REACHED A
SIZE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMMODATE A BICYCLE TIRE

Still another, stand-apart basis on which the Court should reverse the District
Court and order a new trial is the District Court's error in rejecting (R. 6760, Tr. 1516) the Goebels' argument that, given the evidence that gaps do not develop suddenly,
and given the evidence that the crossing had been in place since 1986 (R. 6767, Tr.
1119) (more than eleven years; more than 4,000 days), it was at least a matter of fair
jury inference that the gap had existed in its critical size for a period of time sufficient
to put Southern on constructive notice of the dangerous nature of the gap. See, also,
the discussion appearing, and record citations set forth, at p. 25, above, regarding the
approximately 3A inch width of the gap and the "stabilization" evidence.
The fact that there was no evidence that anyone had in fact noticed the gap to be
of a dangerous width is not determinative of the question. Indeed, given the testimony
by John Martinez, Southern's track inspector that, to his knowledge, Southern had no
one who was actually inspecting crossings to see if they were safe (R. 6065-68; 6167;
6178) and his acknowledgment that he didn't even think about the safety of bicyclists
(R. 6065-68; 6167; 6194) (although he agreed that he had a responsibility to concern
himself with the safety of bicyclists) (R. 6189), it is no surprise that no one actually
noticed the gap. The District Court demanded something from the Goebels that, given
the fact that Southern was not actively inspecting for gaps dangerous to bicyclists, and
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given the fact that bicyclists were not likely to notice the existence of gaps (see
discussion in following paragraph), was virtually impossible to provide.
Constructive notice (meaning that Southern could, by the exercise of reasonable
care, have discovered the dangerous condition) is, under this part of the case analysis,
all that is required. The fact that Mr. Goebel, who had traversed the crossing over a
100 times or more (R. 6765, Tr. 658), had not observed any gaps (R. 6765, Tr. 659) is
not dispositive. Though he had a duty to exercise due care, he had no duty to see that
the crossing was safe. He had been riding his new bike, with the narrower wheels, for
only a few days (R. 6765, Tr. 669-70), and the wheel of his old bike would not have fit
into the gap. R. 6765, Tr. 780, 806; R. 6765, Tr. 942. Also, the uncontroverted
testimony is that Mr. Goebel, traveling between 22 Vi and 30 feet per second as he
traversed the crossing (R. 6765, Tr. 826), with his eyes looking 30-40 feet ahead (R.
6765, Tr. 674), would likely not notice the gap (see, e.g., the testimony of David
Stephens (Southern's witness), who was looking for gaps, that from a distance of more
than 10 or 12 feet back, gaps were difficult, if not impossible, to perceive). R. 6767,
Tr. 1195-96; 1205.
It is not merely speculation on the Goebels' part that the gap existed in a
dangerous size for a period long enough to enable Southern to have had constructive

8

Lest there be any confusion, the Goebels point out that the uncontroverted testimony
was that the tires on the bike Mr. Goebel was riding at the time of the incident are not
extraordinarily narrow. R. 6763, Tr. 351-52.
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notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure the problem. The jury could reasonably
have drawn that inference.
In Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 479 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972), this Court
explained:
Jurors may not speculate as to the possibilities; they may, however, make
justifiable inferences from circumstantial evidence to find negligence or
proximate cause.
The jury would have been required to speculate « given the length of time that
the crossing surface had been in place — to reach the conclusion that the gap had
developed to a dangerous size only at a time so close to the time of the incident that
Southern should not, in the exercise of reasonable care, have noticed it and remedied
it. Southern's track inspections were done over the entire length of the UTA line,
including the subject crossing. R. 6767, Tr. 1170-72. As. Mr. Goebel's counsel
sought (R. 6760, Tr. 15-16) unsuccessfully to explain to the District Court, it defies the
law of probability to suggest that the gap got to the critical size (wide enough to accept
Mr. Goebel's bike tire) only within the three days that went by between the time
Southern's Mr. Martinez did his track inspection, on February 16, 1998 (penultimate
page of Ex. P-33) and the date of the incident. And Mr. Martinez in fact did another
track inspection on February 17th (see the last page of Ex. P.-33; a copy of that exhibit
appears in the Addendum at 036-42), only two days before the incident.
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The District Court erred in taking the case from the jury regarding Southern's
constructive notice of the gap just as it erred in taking the case from the jury on the
other discrete aspects of the Goebels' argument discussed hereinabove.
6.

THE PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM.

The Goebels asserted and presented at trial a public nuisance claim in addition
to their common law negligence claim. One of the agreed-upon jury instructions (R.
5904) embodies the Goebels' and Southern's agreement as to how the law of public
nuisance applies to this case. That instruction, which tracks Utah Code Ann. §76-10803, provides as follows:
Creating or maintaining a public nuisance is unreasonably doing any act or
omitting to perform any duty, which act or omission:
1.
Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of
three or more persons;
2.
Interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous
for passage, any street or highway; or
3.
In any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use
of property.
An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this
instruction is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of annoyance and
regardless of whether the damage inflicted on individuals is unequal.

{

Southern acknowledged (R. 843), in its successful effort to keep the Goebels from
asserting a claim of strict, or per se, public nuisance liability, that the elements of nonstrict liability public nuisance are different from those necessary to be proved in claims

y

of common law negligence. Southern then contended, in the course of oral argument
on its motion for directed verdict, that actual or constructive notice is an element of
I
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public nuisance claims, just like it is of common law negligence claims, and that,
therefore, Southern's supposed lack of actual or constructive notice of the gap doomed
the Goebels' public nuisance claim just as it purportedly doomed the Goebels5
common law negligence claim. R. 6760, Tr. 26-27. The District Court erroneously
agreed with Southern. R. 6761, Tr. 9; R. 6671.
No Utah public nuisance case that has come to the attention of the Goebels'
counsel even discusses the concept of proof of a defendant's notice as a prerequisite to
the success of a plaintiff s public nuisance tort claim. Prosser's Handbook of the Law
tin

of Torts (4 Ed. 1971) does not even mention, in its discussion of Public Nuisance
law, at 583-91, the concept of notice. For a discussion of Utah public nuisance law see
Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1994). There the divided Court of
Appeals panel (or at least Judge Orme) restated the rule that, in the absence of
circumstances justifying application ofper se public nuisance liability, it is necessary
to prove that the defendant's conduct is "unreasonable" and that a showing of
"negligent" conduct is acceptable proof. Id. at 149-50. Notice was not an issue in
Erickson. It would be erroneous for this Court to conclude, as the District Court did
(R. 6761, Tr. 9; R. 6671), that, in the context of public nuisance law, notice is a
requisite part of the "negligent" prong of unreasonable conduct. For if it were, what
would be the point of there being a public nuisance cause of action? This Court should
put semantics aside and rule that a showing of actual or constructive notice need not be
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made to prove that public nuisance conduct - by act or omission - is "negligently"
unreasonable. The inquiry - and it is for the jury - should be whether, in all the
circumstances, including Southern's abject lack of concern for the safety of bicyclists
(R. 6065-68; 6166; 6178; 6194), and in light of the proposition that Southern's very
lack of concern caused it to allow the gaps to remain undetected and unaddressed
through the time of the incident, the conduct of Southern was unreasonable.
Southern acknowledged, as stated above, that the elements of public nuisance
are not the same as those of common law negligence. Most interestingly, as things
turn out, at least one difference is that a public nuisance-claim plaintiff does not need
to prove notice. Southern, having obtained advantage in this litigation by convincing
the District Court that the Goebels could not pursue a per se public nuisance claim,
erroneously argued, in support of its directed verdict motion, that notice was required.
This Court should reverse the directed verdict on this and the other grounds discussed
above and should make it clear that, in the new trial to be held herein, the new jury
shall be affirmatively informed of the fact that no notice is required with respect to the
Goebels'public nuisance claim.

The standard for granting a motion for directed verdict is most stringent. It is,
contrary to the District Court's expressed view, essentially the same as that governing
a motion for summary judgment. Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264
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(Utah 1993). "Under Utah law, a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very
difficult burden of showing that no evidence exists that raises a question of material
fact" Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah 1999), quoting from Alta Health
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah App. 1996). In
reviewing a trial court's grant of directed verdict, this Court "reviews the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ... afford[s] him the benefit of all
inferences which the evidence fairly supports." Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 463
(Utah 1979). Here the District Court erroneously failed adequately to consider the
evidence and the reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from the evidence.
The Court should recognize that the District Court erred and, in the interest of
justice and whatever it does with the other issues in this Appeal, order that a new trial
be held as soon as reasonably possible so that a new jury can decide this case and so
that the Goebels are not further delayed in obtaining justice for their profound
damages sustained by reason of an incident that occurred over 5 years ago.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DETERMINING THAT THE GOEBELS COULD NOT
PURSUE A NON-PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM AGAINST
SOUTHERN BASED ON UTAH CODE ANN. §56-1-11.

The District Court, at the urging of Southern (R. 168-69; 178-80), ruled (R.
364), in the context of the Goebels' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended
Complaint, that the Goebels' proposed claim based on Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 was
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superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence claims and would not be allowed
to be pursued in this litigation. That ruling was erroneous.
Especially if, but not only if, the Court for some reason upholds the directed
verdict, it should determine the District Court's refusal to allow the Goebels to pursue
their claim based on §56-1-11 to be reversible error. The Court should order that, in
the new trial to be held herein, the Goebels may pursue that theory, as well as their
other theories against Southern.
Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 provides:
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road.
"Neglect" is, as the Goebels unsuccessfully sought to explain to the District
Court (e.g., R. 196-97), something different from common law "negligence."
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines "neglect," in its verb usage, as

,

"1: to give little attention or respect to: DISREGARD 2: to leave undone or unattended to
esp. through carelessness." It defines "neglect," in its noun usage, as "an act or
instance of neglecting something." This seems to fit Southern's conduct. See, e.g., the
acknowledgement of Southern's track inspector, Mr. Martinez, highlighted at pp. 27
above, that he did not concern himself at all with the safety of bicyclists. See, also, his

{

testimony, also highlighted at p. 27, that, to his knowledge, Southern had no one
actually inspecting the crossings for safety. There was no such person.
i
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In Van Wagoner v Union Pac. R. Co., 186 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah 1947), one of
the very few reported decisions to discuss §56-1-11, this Court observed, without
discussing the concept of notice, in a case in which the decedent's vehicle had
apparently stalled at a railroad crossing and was struck by a train: "... if decedent was
stalled by holes in the road and the exposure of high rails, his heirs have just
complaint...." And, in Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 171 P. 999 (Utah 1918), the
only discussion of notice has to do with the proposition that, because of the longstanding dangerous condition, judgment as a matter of law, in favor of the plaintiff,
would likely have been in order. Id. at 1002. The Goebels have never yet suggested
that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
When the District Court, at Southern's behest, refused to allow the Goebels to
pursue "neglect" claims based on §56-1-11, it erred in its construction of Utah law.
This Court should rule that claims pursued under §56-1-11 do not require a showing of
actual or constructive notice as an element of a plaintiff s claim against a railroad.
This is good public policy, given the thoroughly public nature of railroad crossings;
and such a ruling would not impose absolute liability. It would simply make it clear
that railroad companies need to be vigilant with respect to making and keeping
crossings safe.
It is instructive that, in VanWagoner, the Court approved, 186 P.2d at 306, the
use of the following liability instruction, one that deals with the fact-sensitive, §56-1-
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11 concepts of "good" and "sufficient" crossings, without mentioning "notice" or
"opportunity to cure" or anything like those common law negligence concepts:
You are further instructed that by the law of this state every railroad company
owning or operating a railroad is required to make and maintain good and
sufficient crossings, equal in width to the main travelled portion of the highway,
at points where any city or town street or public highway crosses its tracks; and
it is liable for all injuries from neglect of this duty if the party injured is guilty
of no negligence contributing to such injury. However, the railroad company is
only obligated to maintain the approaches to the crossing for a distance of two
feet on the outside of its rail and is not liable for defects in the highway or
approach to said crossing if said defects are more than two feet from the outside
of either rail. In this connection you are instructed that a 'good and sufficient
crossing5 is a crossing that is sufficient and ordinarily safe for the travelling
public to pass to and fro over, keeping in mind its location, whether in a
sparsely settled or populous locality, and the character and volume of traffic
that ordinarily may be expected to pass over it.
185P.2dat305.
If a railroad company's notice, actual or constructive, of the dangerous
condition of is crossing was to be a prerequisite for establishing liability in cases of
this kind, there is no good reason for the Utah Legislature to have enacted §56-1-11.
A claim under that statute is not superfluous to a common law negligence claim, and
this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that refused to allow the Goebels
to pursue this aspect of their case against Southern.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DETERMINING THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
SOUTHERN AND UTA DID NOT CREATE A DUTY OF CARE
THAT RAN FROM SOUTHERN TO THE GOEBELS.
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The Agreement between Southern and UTA came into evidence as Ex. P-44. It
is appended hereto at 043-76. The District Court orally ruled (R. 6765, Tr. 598) that
that Agreement was unambiguous and (apparently for that reason) did not allow
extrinsic evidence to come in to explain its meaning; see discussion set forth in
following Part D of this Argument). It was unclear, until the District Court rendered
its oral ruling in response to Southern's motion for directed verdict, how the District
Court's ruling on the non-ambiguity of the contract would cut. That question was
answered when the District Court ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 51 R 6669)9 that that Agreement
gave rise to no duty running from Southern to the Goebels.
Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of the
Agreement make it clear that Southern contracted with UTA to maintain crossings
along the line covered by the Agreement, which, as a matter of undisputed fact,
includes the subject crossing. Section 3.1 provides, in pertinent part:
... [Southern] shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair, and renew the Freight
Trackage so as to preserve the present condition of the track, grade crossings
and signal facilities....
Section 3.3 provides, in pertinent part:
... [Southern] shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the joint
trackage .... Nothing herein shall relieve [Southern] of the obligation to
9

It is interesting that the District Court referred to the "good Samaritan doctrine,"
something that the Goebels have never advanced in this case. By the process of
elimination, that must refer to the Goebels' allegation (R. 535) that a duty ran from
Southern to the Goebels based on that contract and §324A of the Restatement, Second,
of Torts.
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perform maintenance, repair and renewal on the joint trackage in a good and
workman-like manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and
regulations.
Southern will likely contend, as it persistently contended in the District Court
proceedings, that another part of the contract (Section 2.1) means that Southern
somehow did not undertake what it appears to have undertaken in Sections 3.1 and 3.3
and that Southern was forbidden from doing anything of the kind that it
unquestionably did do. Section 2.1 provides, in pertinent part:
[Southern] shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not conduct,
directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Passenger Trackage or any
other activity whatsoever on the Right-of-Way that is not necessary to Freight
Rail Service.
As evidenced by the testimony of Southern's Mr. Martinez (see R. 6065-68; 6167;
6183-85) and the fourth and sixth pages of Ex. P-33, Southern maintained and
repaired, for at least some purposes "unrelated to freight movement" (the linchpin of
Southern's argument under Section 2.1), crossings along the line.
The District Court should have ruled that Sections 3.1 and/or 3.3 clearly, and
despite Southern's argument to the contrary, established a duty to maintain the
crossing in a reasonable manner.
Section 324A of the Restatement, Second, of Torts provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
party or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for his physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his
undertaking, if
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(a)
(b)
(c)

his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or
he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to a third person,
or
the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person
upon the undertaking.

UTA owned the line, the crossing, and its surface. It is "another" and "the other" for
purposes of this Restatement provision. Clearly, the Goebels' case fits, as the claims
of Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones in Alder v. Bayer Corp. 61 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (Utah
2002), fit, one or more of the prongs of §324.
As explained hereinabove, the error by the District Court in finding that no duty
of care ran from Southern to the Goebels pursuant to the Agreement does not
constitute reversible error, given the fact that the District Court correctly determined
(R. 6761, Tr. 3-4; R. 6669) that Southern owed Goebels duties of care under other
legal concepts. The Court should, nonetheless, address this question so that, in the
new trial to be held herein, the Goebels can argue the significance of that duty to the
jury. It may also be important for the Court to address this question because Southern
intends to convince the Court, in its cross-appeal, that the District Court erroneously
determined Southern to have the duties of care discussed in note 4 (pp. 11-12) above.
D.

IF THE COURT RULES THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE
CONTRACT BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND UTA DOES NOT
CLEARLY IMPOSE, ON SOUTHERN, A DUTY OF CARE
RUNNING TO THE GOEBELS, THE COURT SHOULD RULE
THAT THE CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS AND A L L O W THE
GOEBELS TO PRESENT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF ITS
MEANING.
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In the event that the Court determines, for whatever reason, and contrary to the
Goebels' contentions set forth in the immediately foregoing Part C of this Argument,
that the Agreement does not clearly require Southern to maintain the crossing, the
Court should determine that the contract is ambiguous. Given the sections relied upon
by the Goebels (3.1 and 3.3) and the section relied upon by Southern (2.1), it may be
arguable as to what that contract really required of Southern. The Agreement is
ambiguous if there are two reasonably plausible interpretations of what it requires
Southern to do. E.g., Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999).
If the Court makes the determination that the Agreement is ambiguous, it
should then, under established Utah law (id.), allow extrinsic evidence to be presented.
Such extrinsic evidence should include not only what Southern, through Mr. Martinez,
did but also evidence of the kinds the Goebels sought unsuccessfully to introduce at
the trial of this case, including testimony from Crosby Mecham, the UTA point man
for the Agreement and its administration, regarding his understanding of the contract
and the course of conduct of the parties under that contract. R. 6363, Tr. 657-79; R.
6764, Tr. 587-604. The Court should also rule that the District Court erred in
excluding documents evidencing how UTA and Southern interpreted and applied the
contract, including proposed Exhibits 76 and 77, as well as other explanatory
documents, including proposed Exhibits 46 and 47. Evidence of this part of the
history between Southern and UTA will be important in assisting the jury to
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understand who undertook and sought to discharge what duties and also may have a
bearing on the jury's ultimate determination as to whether UTA, in addition to
Southern, had causal fault, and the respective percentages of causal fault of those two
entities. The Court should, especially if it rejects the contention that, as a matter of
law, the contract put a duty on Southern that ran to the Goebels, allow such extrinsic
evidence to be presented to the jury in the new trial. I0
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE GOEBELS TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE OF THE EMPIRICAL TESTING DONE BY THEIR
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT.11

The District Court refused (R. 6766, Tr. 849) the Goebels5 attempt to present
evidence of empirical testing done by their accident reconstruction expert, offered for
the purpose of making even more compelling his opinion regarding incident causation,

10

If the Court accepts the Goebels5 primary argument regarding the Agreement (see
part C of the Agreement), it should still direct the District Court to allow, in the new
trial, Mr. Mecham to give testimony regarding such things as how and why the
Agreement came into existence and who did what in connection with its performance.
For that testimony will likely have bearing on the respective percentages of causal
fault of UTA (if any) and Southern.
11

NOTE: This part of the case has its genesis in Southern's denial that Mr. Goebel's
bike wheel even entered a gap in the crossing surface pads. A reading of the District
Court's ruling (R. 6761, Tr. 9), made in the context of Southern's motion for directed
verdict, and formalized in the District Court's Directed Verdict Order (R. 6670),
suggests that the District Court, after considering all the evidence, rejected that part of
Southern's defense. If Southern concedes, or if this Court rules, that it is now an
established fact that Mr. Goebel's bike's front wheel entered an east-west running gap
between pads that constituted part of the subject crossing surface, the Court need not
consider this part of the Argument.
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Although that expert, David Ingebretsen, was appropriately allowed to offer his
opinion with respect to the proposition that Mr. Goebel's somersault began when his
bike wheel entered the subject gap {e.g., R. 6766, Tr. 864-65), the fact that that
testimony came in should not have caused the District Court to conclude that
Mr. Ingebretsen was unable to testify regarding his empirical testing and the results of
that testing. As explained prior to the District Court's ruling (R. 6766, Tr. 840-47), the
testing that Mr. Ingebretsen did was with an exemplar bicycle, and then with
Mr. Goebel's bicycle itself, with gaps of the approximate size of the gap in question.
Because Southern has contended throughout the course of this litigation, and is
expected so to contend in the new trial, that Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheel could not
have gone into the gap in question {e.g., R. 6761, Tr. 62-64 (Southern's counsel's
opening statement); R. 6766, Tr. 1037 (testimony from Southern's accident
reconstruction expert)), the District Court should be ordered to allow the Goebels to
present the evidence in question. There was nothing improper or (contrary to the
District Court's expressed concern; R. 6766, Tr. 849) potentially misleading about the
proposed testimony. Evidence of the testing would have been of assistance to the jury,
and the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow it. That abuse of
discretion is cast into even sharper focus by the fact that the District Court, after
making that ruling, determined (R. 6766, Tr. 920-22), over the Goebels' objection, to
allow evidence of Southern's accident reconstruction expert's experiment that
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involved conditions unlike the conditions of the subject incident. R. 6766, Tr. 912-14.
The District Court clearly abused its discretion in disallowing the Goebels'
proposed empirical testing evidence, and this Court should order that, in the new trial
to be held herein, the District Court should allow it.
F.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GRANTING SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
1.

NATURE OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY.

The easternmost edge of the crossing surface was only 22 inches east of the
easternmost rail. See discussion at p. 18, above. The protuberance that Mr. Goebel
had to avoid, and in the absence of which he would not (at least as a matter of triable
fact) have encountered the subject gap, extended approximately 4 inches eastward
from the easternmost edge of the crossing surface. R. 6765, Tr. 662. These facts
implicate not only Southern's duty to maintain the crossing to a distance of 2 feet
outside the easternmost rail but also the duty of the City to maintain and repair the
road surface more than 2 feet outside that rail. The City has acknowledged that duty.
R. 2648; 2656.
2.

CONTRARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING, THE
1998 AMENDMENTS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY, THE GOEBELS COMPLIED WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT, AND THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO THE CITY.
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The Goebels acknowledge that Utah appellate law, especially the most recent
cases dealing with the subject, make it clear that the Governmental Immunity Act
demands strict compliance with its provisions.12 As the following discussion will
show, however, the Goebels have, contrary to the District Court's ruling, met the test.
On the date of the incident, February 19, 1998, Utah Code Ann. §63-3011 (3)(b) provided, in pertinent part: "The notice of claim shall be: ... (ii) directed and
delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the requirements of §6330-12 or §63-30-13." Section 63-30-13 is the pertinent one of those two sections
inasmuch as Salt Lake City is a political subdivision and not the State of Utah itself.
Section 63-30-13 provided, as of the date of the incident:
A claim against a political subdivision ... is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises....
(Emphasis added.) The Goebels' notice of claim was directed to, served upon, and
"filed with" DeeDee Corradini, the Salt Lake City Mayor at the time, and the "Salt
Lake City Council and All Members of the Salt Lake City Council." R. 45-46. The
notice of claim was received by Mayor Corradini and the Salt Lake City Council and
its members on August 12, 1998. R. 3914. The claim was promptly denied. R. 47.
There can be no doubt that the Mayor and the City Council constituted the "governing

12

The Goebels are not appealing the District Court's decision (R. 6759, Tr. 7-8; R.
5776) that the notice of claim against the City was defective with respect to
Ms. Goebel's loss-of-consortium claim.
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body" of the City as of the date the claim arose.
The current version of §63-30-11(3), on which the City relies, and which
requires service to be made on the Salt Lake City Recorder, was not passed until
February 23, 1998, was not approved until March 14, 1998, and did not become
effective until May 4, 1998. See excerpt from the proceedings of the 1998 General
Legislative Session. R. 3916.
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 provides: "No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (Emphasis added.) There is no declaration
anywhere in the subject 1998 legislation that its provisions are retroactive. It would
seem, only this deep in the analysis, obvious that the 1998 amendments should not be
applied retroactively and that the District Court erred in its ruling. The complexity of
this issue arises because this Court, in a line of cases including Roark v. Crabtree, 893
P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1995), and Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n,
947 P.2d 671, 675-76 (Utah 1997), has developed a body of law that deals with the
distinction between changes in the law that are "substantive" versus those that are
"procedural only." The idea is that statutory changes that deal with the substance of
claims or defenses will be applied prospectively only and that those that deal only with
the workings of the legal machinery will be applied retroactively. That distinction,
although easily stated, has sometimes proved difficult in application. See, Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Ass'n, 795 P.2d 665, 668, n. 4 (Utah App. 1990).
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The Court should consider, in connection with the question of whether the
pertinent 1998 amendments are to be applied retroactively, the case of Schultz v.
Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). There the Court observed, in the course of
reversing a trial court order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for failure to comply
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act:
It should be noted that in 1987 the legislature amended §63-30-11 to require the
filing of a notice of a claim whether the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental or non-governmental. That amendment,
however, does not apply to the instant case where the claim arose in 1984.
(Emphasis added.) That observation may or may not be dispositive of the Court's
consideration of the issue. If the Court determines that the statutory change mentioned
in Schultz was no more "merely procedural" than are the pertinent 1998 amendments,
the rule of stare decisis would seem to dictate reversal. The Goebels acknowledge,
however, that the matter of whether a notice of claim needs to be served at all (the
question in Schultz) may for some reason be deemed, although both changes are at
least in part conceptually "procedural," to be more "substantive" than is the matter of
on whom notice must be served. The Goebels contend that the one change is as
"substantive" as the other, and that they are entitled, under Schultz, to reversal. The
Goebels, acknowledging that the Court may disagree with that contention, suggest an
alternative analytical construct. This Court is free to fine-tune its "substantive" vs.
"procedural" framework when a case comes along that may not fit neatly, or
completely, into either category; and it is free to develop non-conflicting but
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complementary law dealing with the realities of situations its earlier case law may not
have contemplated. The new reality of the situation here has to do with subject matter
jurisdiction.
Consider where the District Court's ruling potentially leads. Suppose
Mr. Goebel had served the notice of claim on the City Recorder and that he was thus
clearly in compliance with the law not only as of the date the claim arose (assuming
the City Recorder was part of the "governing body" ~ not an obvious conclusion prior
to the statutory change), but also as of the date of service of the notice. Suppose the
Governmental Immunity Act is then amended again, more than a year after the claim
has arisen, to require service on a different City employee (a notion that is not at all
fanciful). Mr. Goebel could then be checkmated, under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13,
which requires service of notices of claim within one year after claims arise, with
respect to his claim against the City. This is because a party's failure strictly to
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act deprives the Utah courts of subject
matter jurisdiction (e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Authority,13 37 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Utah
2001)) and because a defense based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised
at any time {e.g., Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993)). No plaintiff
in a claim against a Utah governmental entity could ever rest assured that his or her

13

Ms. Greene's injury was sustained on September 21, 1998. 37 P.3d at 1157. Her
claim, unlike Mr. Goebel's, thus arose after the 1998 amendments went into effect.
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notice of claim would remain in compliance with the law, and no judgment against a
Utah governmental entity would truly ever be final, if the Court should agree with the
City's position and the District Court's decision on retroactive application of the 1998
amendments. Uncertainty would reign.
That cannot be good law, but that is where the District Court's "procedural
only" conclusion here leads. For, if amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act
notice-of-claim requirements are to be applied retroactively, why should the wording
of the pertinent statutes on the date a notice of claim happens to be served be accorded
any particular importance? Especially if the Court is of the view that Schultz does not
dictate the result sought by the Goebels, and especially if the Court thinks it unwise to
tamper with, or elaborate on, its "substantive vs. procedural" construct, it may wish to
rule — this is not too remarkable a proposition — that lasting subject matter jurisdiction
over a party's claim (something that can only be guaranteed, under the Governmental
Immunity Act, by a ruling that the notice-of-claim law is fixed as of the date the claim
arises) is, indeed, a "substantive" right.
The Goebels do not ask, even in this situation where the City has admitted (R.
536-37; 578) that it had notice of, and denied, the Goebels' claims, that the Court relax
its "strict compliance" rule. They do, however, urge this Court to recognize that its
hands are not in this particular tied by any Utah statute or by any of its previous
decisions. They urge the Court to recognize the uncertainty of what the Legislature
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might do and, in light of Schultz and/or the considerations of subject matter
jurisdiction discussed above, to rule that the law in effect at the time of the incident, at
the time the claims arose, is the one that should govern; that the Goebels served their
notice on the appropriate City representatives; and that the District Court committed
reversible error in granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment.
VII.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

"A smooth, safe crossing surface is important for pedestrians, bicyclists and
vehicular traffic." Ex. P-48 (an excerpt from the "Omni Product Guide"; emphasis
added). Mr. Goebel is living proof of that statement.
A grave injustice was done when the District Court granted Southern's motion
for directed verdict. This Court should, as expeditiously as possible, and so that
Mr. Goebel will be able to participate in a new trial and see justice in this case, reverse
that error and order that a new trial be held.
This Court should also order that, in the new trial, the Goebels shall be allowed
to pursue non-public nuisance claims (as well as public nuisance claims) based on
Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11; the Goebels shall be allowed to pursue their §324A claim
based on the Administration and Coordination Agreement; they shall be allowed, if the
Court determines that that Agreement is ambiguous, to present their extrinsic evidence
regarding its meaning; and that they shall be allowed (unless it is now an established
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fact that Mr. Goebel's bike wheel entered the gap) to present the empirical testing
evidence.
This Court should also rule that the subject 1998 changes to the Governmental
Immunity Act are to be applied prospectively only and should reverse the summary
judgment granted to the City.
Respectfully submitted this /i> day of June, 2003.
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STATUTES AND ORDINANCE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL

RE:

ISSUE NO. 1.

Utah Code Ann. §10-7-26(2) provides, in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this section ... shall be construed
to exempt any railway company from keeping every
portion of every street and alley used by it and upon
or across which tracks shall be constructed at or near
the grade of such streets in good and safe condition
for public travel .... The portions of the streets ... to
be so kept and maintained by all such railway
companies shall include all the space between their
different rails and tracks and also a space outside of
the outer rail of each outside track of at least two
feet in width.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-29 provides, in pertinent part:
All railway companies shall be required to pave or
repave at their own cost all the space between their
different rails and tracks and also a space two feet
wide outside of the outer rails of the outside track
in any city or town, including all ... crossings ... used
by such companies.... The tracks of all railway
companies when located upon the streets or avenues of
a city or town shall be kept in repair and safe in all
respects for the use of the traveling public, and such
companies shall be liable for all damages resulting by
reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair or for
obstructing the streets. For injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of any such company
to keep its tracks in proper repair and free from
obstruction such company shall be liable.... The word
"railway companies" as used in this section shall be
taken to mean and include any persons, companies,
corporations or associations owning or operating any
street or other railway in any city or town.
(Emphasis added.)
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Salt Lake City Ordinance §14.44.030 provides, in pertinent"
part:
A.
Every railway company operating within the
boundaries of the city shall keep every portion of
every city street or alley upon or across which their
tracks shall be or are constructed and maintained in
good and safe condition to accommodate public travel.
(Emphasis added.)

RE:

ISSUE NO. 2.

Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 provides:
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused
by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient
crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its
road.

RE:

ISSUE NO. 3.

The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 that was in effect
at the time the Goebels' claim arose provided, in pertinent
part:
(2) any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity ... shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining an action....
The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 that was in effect
at the time the Goebels' claims arose provided, in pertinent
part:
A claim against a political subdivision ... is barred unless
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the
potential subdivision within one year after the claim
arises...

002
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The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 that went into
effect after the Goebels' claims arose, and that is presently in
effect, provides, in pertinent part:
(3) (b) The notice of claim shall be:
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim
is against an incorporated city or town...
. The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 that went into
effect after the Goebels' claims arose, and that is presently in
effect, provides, in pertinent part:
A claim against a political subdivision ... is barred unless
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the
political subdivision according to the requirements of
Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim arises....
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on June 14, 2002)

3

THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is case

4

No. 980912368.

5

have you identify yourselves for the record once again.

6
7

MR. COLLINS: Peter Collins representing the plaintiffs
George and Kathy Goebel, your Honor.

8
9

MR. SAVAGE: Scott Savage and Casey McGarvey
representing the defendant Salt Lake City Southern.

10
11

MR. HANSEN: Kent Hansen representing the City, also
present Clair Williams.

12
13

MS. STONEBROOK: Martha Stonebrook representing Salt
Lake City Corporation.

14
15

Starting with the plaintiff's Counsel, let's

MR. TRENTADUE: Jesse Trentadue and Kathy Woods
representing Utah Transit Authority.

16

THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

That's

17

it?

18

time the Court's set on the calendar to rule on the pending

19

motions for summary judgment.

20

for giving me the opportunity to review all the information

21

that was submitted to me.

22

consequently I'm going to rule as follows.

23

All right.

Anyone else?

The record should reflect that this is the

I'd like to thank all of you

I've had a chance to do that, and

I'd like to first, however, address the issue of

24

breach and proximate cause as it relates to Salt Lake Southern

25

Union Pacific and UTA.

I want to set Salt Lake City aside for
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-3just a second, because there is an obvious relationship amongst
the defendants at least as to that particular issue.

Based

upon everything I've read here I've come to the following
conclusion.
That taking as a whole the testimony of plaintiff s
experts, the eyewitness —

I think his name is Mr. Roberts

—

Mr. Goebel's testimony as well, and one of the experts I'm
referencing, I think it's Mr. Smith and Mr. Collins and in
particular Mr. Ingerbretsen.

In this Court's view when you

consider that evidence as a whole, I do find that the testimony
establishes sufficient evidence which an inference may be
reasonably drawn that the injury suffered was caused by a
negligent act of the defendant, especially in the context of,
in this Court's view, a lack of any non-speculative other cause
of this accident.
At the very least genuine issues of material fact have
been established in this Court's view which precludes summary
judgment.

In coming to that conclusion for at least record

purposes I have relied on the Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed
decision which is cited by plaintiffs and found at 479 P.2d 28.
I think that's a 1972 Utah Supreme Court case.
As to Southern as well, for purposes of this summary
judgment motion, this Court is also finding that these were the
other issues raised in Southern's motion for summary judgment,
that Southern does owe a duty to the plaintiff under various
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-4statutory provisions including Utah Code Annotated 56-1-11,
10-7-29, as well as the Salt Lake City ordinance which I
believe is 14.44.030.
Additionally, as to the duty issue at least, there are
genuine issues of material fact.

As to whether Southern is a

possessor or occupier of land for the restatement purposes, and
the cite of 3-28(e), restatement provision for duty purposes.
Additionally based upon the evidence the Court is
finding as well that there are genuine issues of material fact
as to Southern's actual or constructive notice of the defect
and opportunity to correct.

So Southern's motion for summary

judgment is denied.
Going now to UTA, as I indicated a moment ago, the
breach in proximate cause analysis I believe also applies to
UTA.

Additionally, in this Court's view, as to the duty

questions raised by UTA, again under the restatement 3-28(e),
I do think there's a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether UTA is a possessor or occupier of land.
upon which and under a duty to keep reasonably —

Of course,
that property

reasonably safe applies to a possessor and occupier of land.
Additionally, and I think this is found under the cite
of the restatement 2d 353, clearly genuine issues of material
fact in this Court's view based upon the evidence regarding
UTA's knowledge of the acts, negligent installation, knowledge
of expansion of the gaps.

That 353 restatement section really
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-5is a —

also involves an unreasonable risk analysis, and

clearly in this Court's view the evidence is at a state where
genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.
I should also note specifically for whatever value it
may have, I have yet to determine and have not determined as of
yet, I do want to make clear, an issue which is being reserved,
that I have not concluded, that under 10-7-29 of the Utah Code,
or any Utah case law, that UTA is a railway company or railroad
company.

That is an issue that may require further briefing.

For those reasons UTA's motion for summary judgment is denied.
I should also note in particular as it relates to
UTA's motions —

I think this was raised by Counsel as well

—

this Court is finding as well that because of the nature of the
defect, that the experts that plaintiffs have presented thus
far are sufficient to survive summary judgment, and that UTA
is not entitled to summary judgment because of plaintiff's
failure —

I think Mr. Trentadue made this statement in oral

argument —

failure to produce a railroad expert to talk about

the standard of care.

Based upon the nature of the defect in

this particular case and the —

and plaintiff's experts, the

Court is denying summary judgment on that claim.
Going now to Union Pacific, and again the breach
proximate cause analysis applies equally to Union Pacific,
there are a couple of different twists, however, but I still
come to the conclusion that's appropriate to deny Union
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Pacific's motion for summary judgment for the following

2

reasons.

3

At least for the purpose of this motion, Union Pacific

4

has admitted to negligent installation resulting in gaps at

5

this crossing.

6

regarding the significance of gaps at the time of installation.

7

So in this Court's view we at least have genuine issues of

8

material fact as to Union Pacific's, and if nothing else,

9

genuine issues of material fact regarding Union Pacific's

Then we have the testimony of Mr. Ingerbretsen

10

knowledge of gaps at the time of installation, the significance

11

of gaps widening.

12

I don't think the issue of whether or not you can

13

make the disclosure of that problem is disputed, but clearly

14

that is the theory advanced by the plaintiffs.

15

that's pursuant to the restatement 2d 353 as well, which

16

involves an analysis of unreasonable risk and whether or not

17

that defect was an unreasonable risk or not, which in this

18

Court's view is, under the circumstances presented and evidence

19

presented, clearly a genuine issue of material fact exists

20

precluding summary judgment.

21

is going to deny Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment.

22

I'm going now to Salt Lake City's motion for summary

I believe

So for those reasons the Court

23

judgment.

Let me say that I am going to grant Salt Lake City's

24

motion for summary judgment for the following reasons.

25

a look at all the cases, and the 1998 revisions.

I took

I looked at
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-71 I all the cases that dealt with retroactivity, and the analysis
2

of whether statutory provisions are procedural or substantive,

3

and that being an important consideration as to whether or not

4

a provision is retroactive or not.

5

In this Court's view the 1998 revisions were not

6

substantive; that they were procedural; that they only change

7

the place where notice is to be delivered didn't affect any of

8

the substantive rights of plaintiff at all.

9

procedural.

10

It was purely

In this Court's view those provisions then have

11

retroactive application, and in this particular case when the

12

claim was filed —

13

believe it was in August.

14

Of course, the

15

was the City recorder wherein —

16

the notice of claim needed to be filed.

17

there.

18

law is clear that strict compliance is required, the Court is

19

going to grant Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment.

20

To the extent that it may have some appellate value

and forgive me for the exact date, but I
I believe it was in August of *98.

x

98 revisions were effective at that time.

It

or the recorder's office where
It was not filed

For that reason and because of the fact that the case

21

as well, let me also add that at Salt Lake City's invitation I

22

did take the opportunity to review and reconsider this Court's

23

prior ruling in a motion to dismiss.

After giving that —

the

24 I cases and the most recent cases for consideration, I have come
25

010

to the conclusion as well that strict compliance is required.
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-8Dealing the notice in particular in the context of —

the

notice of claim in the context of Mrs. Goebel's loss of
consortion claim, I have concluded that that —

by just

placing her name on the notice of claim was not sufficient
was not —

—

sufficient notice was not strict compliance with the

statutory provisions governing notice —
claims and their content.

filing of notice of

So for that additional reason the

Court would enter an order dismissing the loss of consortion
claim.
I think that's it from my perspective.

Let's start

with Mr. Collins, if you have any questions about the manner
in which I've ruled now, now is the time to put them to me.
MR. COLLINS: I have no questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: Then let me give defense Counsel an
opportunity to defend.

Go ahead.

MR. SAVAGE; I have no questions, your Honor.

I think

on behalf of all of us, although we disagree with the ruling,
we appreciate the time and effort the Court's obviously put
into this.

It's readily apparent to all of us that you've

spent a lot of time on this thing.
THE COURT: It's a lot to read.
MR. SAVAGE: And we were very sensitive about overburdening the Court, and we appreciate the Court's effort.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SAVAGE: With what remains we have a motion in
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-9limine with respect to Mr. Collins' experts that hasn't been
fully briefed, and I believe based on the Court's ruling that
we may have an issue —

in fact, I'm almost certain we'll have

an issue as to whether or not to include Salt Lake City on the
verdict form.
THE COURT: I'm sure you will.
MR. SAVAGE: Yeah.

I handed you one.

So we may want to be scheduling

between now and trial some disposition of that matter, as well
as the issue of the experts.
MR. TRENTADUE: One thing, your Honor, with respect to
the Court's ruling as to Salt Lake City since strict compliance
is a jurisdictional issue we would probably move for a directed
verdict as to the loss of consortion claim for the same basis.
THE COURT: Well, you're going to have to brief that
for me, Mr. Trentadue.

I've not given that any consideration

at all at this point, to be honest with you.

I did consider

what impact Salt Lake City not being on this case had, and
whether they would be on the special verdict form or not,
and I knew I was going to be confronting this issue, but that
probably ought to be the subject of briefing.

I mean, I have

some gut reactions, but I'll keep them to myself at this point
and wait until the issue is fully briefed.
MR. TRENTADUE: So do I, for what it's worth, Judge.
MR. COLLINS: I don't.
THE COURT: I do want to make it clear that I have
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definitely not ruled on that issue.

2

Go ahead.

MR. COLLINS: One question, your Honor, and I wasn't

3

altogether clear from your rulings whether or not you intended

4

that to apply to both the alleged negligent installation claims

5

as well as the duty to warn.

6

THE COURT: I did.

I did.

7

MR. COLLINS: Okay.

8

THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel.

9

MS. STONEBROOK: I just wanted to say not all of us

10

disagree with your ruling.

11

revisiting the issues and spending the time.

12

I do join in thanking you for

THE COURT: I'll need for you to draft an order

13

consistent with the matter in which I ruled on behalf of the

14

City, and Mr. Collins, I'll ask that you draft an order as it

15

relates to the other defendants on their motions for summary

16

judgment.

17

MR. SAVAGE: Just one point, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Yes.

19

MR. SAVAGE: According to my calendar, the next thing

20

we're doing on this case is a pretrial conference on Tuesday,

21

June 25th.

22

THE COURT: Yeah, that's a correct statement.

23

MR. SAVAGE: And just so that we're all on the same

24

page, your Honor, I think you gave us a new date for the

25

designation of exhibits, but I'm not quire sure that I have
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-11that written down.

Can anybody help me on that?

MR. COLLINS: I think we just struck it pending the
pretrial.
THE COURT: Yeah.

Unfortunately I would not have

written that down either.
MR. COLLINS: I think we just struck the date and

—

THE COURT: And I would encourage you to try to —

if

you can get that worked out right now amongst yourselves that
will be great, as far as I'm concerned.
MR. SAVAGE: I can't imagine that's a problem in
rounding them all up.
MR. COLLINS: And on that pretrial date, Judge, can you
just give us a little guidance on what you expect to deal with
that day.
THE COURT: Just one moment.
MR. COLLINS: I think you mentioned a questionnaire and
some other things.
THE COURT: Okay.

Have you begun to talk about a

questionnaire at all?
MR. SAVAGE: I think we all thought it was a little
premature (inaudible), also.

It's something we'll begin to

talk about.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask now.

I have not been

privy to, and I'm not asking to be privy now.
being very guarded here.

014

I'm obviously

I don't know where the state of any
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-12settlement negotiations are.

I know that you've had some

process.

I don't know —

again, I don't know where you are.

So I'm —

well, let me just throw it out there.

Have the

opportunities to get this case resolved by way of settlement
been exhausted?
MR. COLLINS: Well, I guess hope springs eternal,
Judge.

We did have a mediator, but it didn't go very far.
THE COURT: Well, let me —

the reason why I ask that

question because, I mean, if you're satisfied that it's futile
then there's no sense in requiring you to bring —

right now

requiring you to bring on the 25th individuals with authority to
settle this case, and the only thing we'll be talking about at
the time of the conference itself will be trial management type
issues so we can expeditiously try the case.

That's what I did

not know.
MR. SAVAGE: My view is that it's futile, but the
person I don't know that could change that is the plaintiff
and the plaintiff's view as to their assessment of the case,
but given their assessment of the case when there was a chance
of

us getting summary judgment, I don't think that the odds

have suddenly improved.
THE COURT: Mr. Collins.
MR. COLLINS: I guess I have to say if it's fueled from
Mr. Savage's side's perspective it's probably fueled from our
side as well.
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-13THE COURT: Then we'll just deal with case management
issues, then, when we come on the 25th.
—

You would help me a lot

and I don't know what your schedules are —

I mean, I would

love to have at least a proposed questionnaire by that time.
MR. SAVAGE: I'll take a shot at it, Judge.
THE COURT: Do you anticipate that —

do you have time

between now and the 25th, for example, to sit down and start
talking about your ability to come to an agreement as to
admission of documents so we don't have to spend unnecessary
time dealing with those kinds of issues?
MR. COLLINS: I think we can certainly make time,
Judge.
THE COURT: I notice that the defendants aren't saying
—

that Counsel for the defendants aren't saying anything at

all.
MR. SAVAGE: Well, it's just my experience has been
that that's very difficult to do that far in advance of trial.
We'll all get working, but that's usually something that's more
productive a day or two before the trial starts than the 25th
which is a couple of weeks before.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SAVAGE: I'm very confident we should be able to
arrive at agreements on foundation, and the only issue would be
relevance or prejudice.

I can't imagine we're going to have

problems with bringing people in just to lay foundation.
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-14think that matter I'm quite optimistic about, but in terms of
just having a list so that we can all agree is admissible, I
don't think that's going to be doable by the 25th.
THE COURT: When do you think the issues you've
described will be fully briefed?

Will they be briefed before

the 25th?
MR. SAVAGE: If Mr. Collins has a response memo, then
we could do a reply probably in 4 8 hours on a motion that's
been filed.

As to the issue of what to do now with Salt Lake

City on a verdict form, we could probably put together a memo
in about a week on that.
MR. COLLINS: I may

—

THE COURT: Do you think you could get all of that
briefed before —

on or before the 25th so at least —

do you

expect you're going to want oral argument on those as well?
MR. COLLINS: I don't know yet.

I haven't done the

research or had anybody do the research to see.
struck me in the course of your ruling today, but

That just
—

THE COURT: I was identifying that as something that we
could possibly accomplish on the 25th if

—

MR. COLLINS: Yeah, I understand, and maybe it can be
done by then.

I don't know.

My gut impression is that Utah

law in that area is kind of messed up.

The 40 percent rule,

and whether Salt Lake City is analogous to a parting with
immunity, or are they analogous to a party that's settled, and
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I just don't know if there's any case law on that, or if we're

2

just going to be down here giving your our best guess.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

MR. SAVAGE: But Judge

5

THE COURT: I'm sorry, go ahead.

6

MR. McGARVEY: I was just —

—

for what it's worth, we'll

7

be filing a motion in limine with respect to Mr. Ingerbretsen

8

and retro dovetail with what Salt Lake City has filed, and add

9

some other issues as well, and that will be filed next week.
THE COURT: Well, maybe on the 25th we'll —

10

obviously

11

we'll just be having the trial management conference and a

12

status conference as to depending upon what is filed or entered

13

by then.

14

MR. TRENTADUE: I have a suggestion.

15

THE COURT: Go ahead.

16

MR. TRENTADUE: I'm sure I'll be filing some motions

17

in limine as well, and I know that we're set to start trial on

18

Tuesday, July 9th.

19

you would —

20

when it is that you would like to pick the jury.

21

that morning or if you want us to submit the questionnaire the

22

day before.

23

could set a time for hearing on our motions in limine between

24

the time of pretrial or the time we start the trial.

25

We haven't yet talked about when it is that

knowing that there's only eight days set for trial
Whether it be

The reason I mention that now is that perhaps we

THE COURT: I can tell you now what I'm going to —
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course, I haven't seen the questionnaire, but what I'm thinking

2

about right now is that I would get the jury panel in here the

3

morning of the 8th to complete the questionnaire and then make

4

the copies and to distribute it to you, and then we could come

5

in on the 9th and begin selecting the jury, in essence, but I

6

haven't seen the questionnaire yet.

7
8
9
10
11
12

MR. COLLINS: Right.

You don't know how long it will

be or what we can agree to.
THE COURT: Correct.
MR. COLLINS: Do you have time to visit with us on any
motions prior to the 9th, Judge?
THE COURT: You know, if you ask me that question now

13

I'm going to tell you no, and I'm not being disingenuous.

14

mean, I start a jury next week, but the bottom line is that I'm

15

expecting we're going to try your case in July.

16

have to make the time when it's so requested, but it is very

17

difficult for me to locate time right now, not knowing what's

18

going to be filed and when everything is going to be fully

19

briefed by.

20
21

I

I'm going to

MR. SAVAGE: Let's see what happens on the 25th, then.
That's probably the best suggestion.

22

THE COURT: All right.

Anything else?

23

MR. SAVAGE: Not for me, Judge.

24

MR. COLLINS: No, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Thank you.

Thank you.

We'll recess at this time.
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JULY 18, 2002
9:05 A.M.
PROCEEDINGS
•k

THE COURT:

•*-

~k

~k

-k

The record should reflect that the jury

is not present at this time.
Counsel, this is the time that I indicated to you
that I would rule on Southern's motion for a directed verdict.
And let me sa^ first that Mr. Savage's motion for a directed
verdict, as he referenced yesterday, is based on all the issues
raised and identified in Southern's motion for summary
judgment
After going over those moving papers again and
considering ttie evidence introduced in this particular case, I
would at least like to go first to the duty question that's
raised in the moving papers.
As to Southern's motion for directed verdict on the
duty question, I'm going to deny Southern's motion.

I've come

to that (conclusion in essence for the following reasons.
Let me say that I've concluded, Mr. Savage and
Mr. McGarvey, that Southern is a railroad or railway company
bringing them within that definition and bringing them within
the statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 10-7--26,
10-7-29, 56-1--11(m), as well as the Salt Lake City ordinance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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14.44.030.

And in this court's view, the key language bringing

Southern within the definition of a railroad/railway is the
"operating a railway" language.

And in this court's view, that

language is broad enough to encompass Southern's operation, use
and utilization of the easement that they had supported by the
evidence in this particular case to fall within those statutory
definitions.

So I would find that Southern has a duty under

those provisions.
I would also like to note as well that this court
would also find a common law duty for Southern because of and
based on the principle that the plaintiff's claim of negligence
arises out of Southern's utilization of its easement, their
allegation that the crossing was defective, or dangerous, I
should say, and the evidence in this particular case as to how
dangerous gaps are developed.
I think it's undisputed that there are a whole list
of factors, one of the factors being rail traffic, rail
tonnage.

And in this court's view, the plaintiff's claim for

negligence arises out of Southern's use and utilization of
their easement, giving rise to common law duties.
There were two other points I want to make some
reference to at least.

And that is, consistent with Southern's

memorandum in support and in reply, I am also finding that a
duty does not arise under what Southern describes as a Good
Samaritan Doctrine.

024

That doctrine requires a number of
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1

requirements that are set forth in moving papers and I agree

2

with Southern that those requirements have not been satisfied

3

so the duty does not arise therefrom.

4

Additionally, in this court's view I've found the

5

agreements between Southern and UTA to be clear and unambiguous

6

and this court is also finding that no duty arises from those

7

contractual agreements as well.

8
9

I am going to move on now to what I really think is
the heart of this court's ruling, because there is a portion of

10

Southern's motion for a directed verdict which I am going to

11

grant which I think is fatal to the plaintiff's cause of

12

action.

13

language is out of the Fishbaugh case, which is spelled

14

F-I-S-H-B-A-U-G-H.

15

front of me, but it's cited in all of the memoranda.

16

quote is out of that opinion and the quote is actually taken

17

out of the Allen versus Federated Dairy Farms case, which is

18

found at 538, Pacific Second, 175, and I probably won't

19

pronounce this name correctly, but the Schnuphase versus Store

20

Markets case, which is found at 918, Pacific Second, 476.

21

that name I couldn't pronounce is spelled, S-C-H-N-U-P-H-A-S-E

22

versus Store Markets.

And I want to read this language, and I think this

I apologize for not having the cite in
This

And

23

This principle is espoused in those cases and, in the

24

court's view, a long line of cases in the state of Utah holding

25

for this principle.

And I quote, "Fault cannot be imputed to
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the defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two
conditions are met:
That he had knowledge of the condition, that is,
either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge because the
condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it, and, (b), that after such knowledge such time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have
remedied it.
And in this court's view, I don't believe that there
is any competent evidence that would support a verdict in this
particular case because the plaintiff has established in this
court's view no competent evidence that a dangerous gap existed
prior to the accident or that a dangerous gap existed for a
period of time sufficient to allow Southern to discover it and
a sufficient amount of time for Southern to remedy it.

Without

that evidence, based on the authorities I cited, in this
court's view Southern is entitled to a grant of their motion
for a directed verdict.
In reaching this decision, consistent with the
authorities, I am required to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to Mr. Goebel.

And in viewing the evidence on the

issue of notice and opportunity to cure in a light most
favorable to Mr. Goebel, the best I believe the evidence
establishes in that light is that dangerous gaps develop over
time.

026
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1

In this court's view, that does not constitute

2

competent evidence to allow the jury to make a reasonable

3

inference as to how long it existed prior to the accident or

4

when it existed prior to the accident.

5

duration, you can't establish when it existed, it appears to me

6

that only through speculation can the jury attempt to reach

7

those conclusions in an effort to determine whether or not

8

there was sufficient time to impart notice and sufficient time

9

to remedy.

10

If you can't establish

In this particular case, the state of the evidence

11

is -- considering in a light most favorable to Mr. Goebel,

12

there is not one single report of a dangerous gap existing at

13

this location prior to the accident.

14

employee-type witnesses that testified in this particular case,

15

none of them testified as to the existence of a dangerous gap

16

prior to the accident.

17

dangerous gap in existence at this location prior to the

18

accident.

19

a dangerous gap in existence at this location prior to the

20

accident.

21

The inspector railroad

No maintenance record establishes a

No public complaint was received by anyone regarding

The plaintiff's witnesses who ride bikes who traverse

22

the location in question saw no dangerous gaps at the location

23

in question prior to the accident.

24

possibly, Mr. Goebel, who testified that he traversed this

25

location at least 100 times made no observation, report,

Maybe the best witness
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1

complaint of a dangerous gap at this location prior to the

2

accident.

3

One of the cases cited to me by Mr. Collins was the

4

Maloney case, and there are other cases in the state as well

5

that deal with this particular issue.

6

think is very distinguishable from this particular case, there

7

was evidence that the defect in Maloney existed two months

8

prior to the accident.

9

But in Maloney, which I

There was another case cited to me I think by

10

Mr. Savage, and it was the Kleinhart case, I think the spelling

11

is K-L-E-I-N-H-A-R-T, it had to do with an elevator.

12

issue arose.

13

were maintenance records which assisted in establishing the

14

existence of the defect prior to the accident, there were

15

complaints by employees in the building where this elevator was

16

as to the defective condition of this elevator.

17

type of evidence which is, in this court's view, glaringly

18

missing to provide a jury in this case a competent basis to

19

draw an inference or come to a conclusion as to how long, if at

20

all, the dangerous gap in this particular case existed prior to

21

the accident.

22

The same

And in that particular case, for example, there

That's the

Now, let me also say that because the court has

23

reached that conclusion, and I should note as well because

24

there's been some discussion about this, in this court's view,

25

as a matter of law, the protuberance is not a proximate cause

098
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of the injuries complained of by the plaintiff in this

2

particular case.

3

accident, but no gap -- no dangerous gap, no accident.

4

dangerous gap is a proximate cause of the injuries which

5

plaintiff complains.

6

It may very well be a factor in this
The

The fact that the evidence may be in conflict as to

7

the duration of this protuberance, whether it is a protuberance

8

or not, in this court's view because of the fact that it is the

9

gap which is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries is not

10

inconsistent with the manner in which this court has ruled.

11

I should also note that we have a public nuisance

12

cause of action as well.

13

verdict on the public nuisance cause of action.

14

chance to review the Erickson versus Sorensen case which I

15

think is authored by Judge H o m e .

16

c^se,

17

nuisance.

18

but those exceptions are intentional conduct, reckless conduct,

19

ulnrahazardous activity.

20

particular case.

21

nuisance.

22

has ruled on the negligence claim in this court's view is also

23

fatal to the public nuisance claim.

24
25

And I'm also granting a directed
I've had a

And the way I read that

you don't have negligence, you don't have public
Now, there are some exceptions I think in that case,

We have none of that in this

Absent negligence, you don't have public

And consistent with the manner in which the court

Let me also say so the record is clear on this point
as well, as to the notice and opportunity to repair issues that
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1

are briefed and cited in Southern's memorandum in support of

2

motion for a summary judgment and in reply by this reference

3

because I have not identified each and every authority

4

contained therein by this reference, the court is in fact

5

relying on each and every piece of authority and analysis

6

that's set forth in those portions of Southern's memoranda.

7

Just so that the record is clear on this point as

8

well, there are a number of other issues raised by Southern in

9

their motion for a directed verdict, and the court is denying

10
11

Southern's motion for a directed verdict on the remaining.
I made this comment to Mr. Collins yesterday.

The

12

practical reality is that as a trial court judge you factor

13

into an equation of judicial economies.

14

yesterday, I just think it's improper for me to allow the

15

judicial economy argument to override a conclusion that a party

16

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

But as I stated

17

Just a second.

18

I think I've placed everything on the record I

19

intended to do regarding the court's ruling, and I'm going to

20

ask Mr. Savage just to draft findings, conclusions and an order

21

consistent with the manner which the court has ruled today.

22

Mr. Collins?

23

MR. COLLINS:

One thing I'd like to ask, Your Honor,

24

just for my edification and for the benefit of my clients'

25

understanding of this.

rnn

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

You may recall that at my request you came back into
the courtroom last -- well, late yesterday afternoon after we
adjourned and I think we had a discussion, brief discussion on
the record.

Mr. Savage was here.

I'm just -- it's an argument

that I didn't articulate when we were arguing the directed
verdict itself, but I asked you to take a look at a -THE COURT:

An instruction?

Yeah, I looked at all

the instructions submitted and I think the authorities that I
have announced are controlling.
MR. COLLINS:
Your Honor.

If I could just make one statement,

I doubt that it's going to make any difference at

this point, but -THE COURT:

Let me ask you this:

Are you going to

attempt to bring something new to me that wasn't brought to me
previously?

If you're going to do that I'm going to foreclose

you from doing that because I don't think anyone -- there comes
a point where I have to draw a line and make a decision, and I
have done that.

And I don't think anyone in this courtroom can

complain about whether or not they've had a full and fair
opportunity to present their case and issue.

So I have to draw

a line at some point in time and I want to do it now, if your
intention is to raise new issues that were never raised.
MR. COLLINS:

Well, it had to do with line of

authority from other jurisdictions that said that in a railroad
crossing case if there's a statute that says that a railroad
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

has a duty to make it safe there's no requirement of actual or

2

constructive notice.

3

THE COURT:

I'm aware of that authority and I think

4

consistent with the manner I've ruled I don't think that is

5

controlling authority in this case.

6

Mr. Savage?

7

MR. SAVAGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

We will prepare

8

the order.

9

any, as to whether we await the discharge of the jury or --

10

I'd like to know what the Court's preference is, if

THE COURT:

The jury is going to get here at

11

10:00 a.m.

It was my intention to take them into the jury

12

deliberation room and discharge them at that time after giving

13

them an explanation of the court's ruling.

14

MR. SAVAGE:

15

THE COURT:

That's fine.
You should know as well, and I think

16

Mr. Collins is aware of this, I do a standard practice whereby

17

after a jury is discharged I enlighten them to spend time with

18

me in effort to answer any questions they may have.

19

a learning experience for me so I can learn how I can make

20

their experience more comfortable.

21

in fact the jury wants to stick around to do that.

22

It's also

And I intend to do that if

You should know I usually also tell them that it's

23

not unusual that they may be contacted by counsel for

24

educational purposes and that it's up to them to decide

25

individually whether or not they wish to have any discussions
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after they've been dis^charged.
MR. SAVAGE:

All right.

So we may be excused then

from awaiting the jury -THE COURT :

You may.

And there's one concern I had,

maybe more paranoia than anything else since we've done so much
in this case.

We had stipulations regarding deposition

testimony that was read into the record.

We have to get to a

point, if you 've not done this already, where you need to
segregate out from those depositions those portions that you
read in open court.
MR. SAVAGE:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
Of course, consistent with the

stipulation, we were not on the record when that was done.
we need to get that done.

So

I don't think you've done that

already.
MR. SAVAGE:

No, we haven't.

We will have that by

tomorrow morn.Ing.
THE COURT:

Okay.

If there's nothing else, we will

recess at this time.
Oh, and one other thing, and I mean this genuinely,
irrespective of how I ve ruled throughout the course of this
case:

It was truly a pleasure to have the three of you,

including Mr. and Mrs

Goebel, prosecute this case in front of

me in the pro.fessional manner in which you have done so.
This was not the easiest case in the world and it
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1

could have been made a lot more difficult if the lawyers chose

2

to fight one another instead of trying the facts and the law.

3

I just want to let you know that I really do appreciate it when

4

lawyers practice in front of me in that manner.

5

surprised or you might not be surprised with the regularity

6

upon which that does not occur.

7

you for handling the case in a very professional manner.

8

recess at this time.

9 I

You might be

But I just wanted to say thank

(Conducted at 9:31 A.M.)

10

n
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

We'll

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)

3 I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
4

I, TEENA GREEN, RPR, CSR, do certify that I am a

5

nationally certified reporter and a Certified Shorthand

6

Reporter in and for the State of Utah,

7

That at the time and place of the proceedings in the

8

foregoing matter, I appeared as the official court reporter in

9

the Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Tyrone E,

10

Medley, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the

11

proceedings had therein.

12

notes of the Judge's Ruling were transcribed by computer into

13

the foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and

14

correct transcript of the same,

15

That thereafter, my said shorthand

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on

16 I this, the 18th day of July 2002
17
1 8

<=*^ /

^

^

. ^ ^ € ^ P

Teena Green,

RPR^ CSR

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION AGREEMENT

This

ADMINISTRATION

" C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement")

AND

COORDINATION

AGREEMENT

(the

i s made a s o f t h e 3 1 s t day of March,

1 9 9 3 , between S a l t Lake City Southern R a i l r o a d C o . , I n c . , a Texas
corporation

("SLS") and Utah T r a n s i t A u t h o r i t y ,

a public

transit

d i s t r i c t o r g a n i z e d urfder T i t l e 17A, Chapter 2 , Part 10, Utah Code
A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a s amended ("UTA").

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, pursuant t o the Purchase and S a l e Agreement between
Union

Pacific

Railroad Company

("UPRR")

and UTA,

dated

as

of

O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1992 (the "Purchase Agreement"), UPRR has conveyed t o
UTA. a s of t h e d a t e of t h i s Coordination Agreement c e r t a i n

right-of-

way, t r a c k a c e and other a s s e t s and improvements l o c a t e d on UPRR's
Provo S u b d i v i s i o n Line, and on UPRR's Lovendahl Spur a l s o known'as
t h e Midvale Lead,
"Riaht-of-Way")

(more f u l l y d e s c r i b e d and d e f i n e d below as t h e

excluding a f r e i g h t

railroad

operating

easement

w h i c h was r e t a i n e d by UPRR;

WKZRZAS, pursuant t o a f r e i g h t r a i l r o a d o p e r a t i n g easement and
an a s s i g n m e n t agreement between UPRR and SLS, dated as of March 3 1 ,
19S3 ( t h e "Easement Agreement") , UPRR has conveyed t o SLS as of t h e
d a t e of t h i s Coordination Agreement a f r e i g h t r a i l r o a d
easement

on

Easement")

the

Right-of-Way

(defined

below

as

the

operating
M

Freight

i n order t o enable SLS t o p r o v i d e common c a r r i e r

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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o

WHEREAS, t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o
usage

of

below;

(DTA and SLS) w i l l

t h e - Right-of-Way under t e r m s

and c o n d i t i o n s

sharing

set

forth

and

WHEREAS, t h e p a r t i e s d e s i r e t o c l a r i f y
respective
carrier

be

rights

rail

construction

and o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t

freighrfe
of

and e s t a b l i s h

operations

additional

on t h e

t o SLS's

Right-of-Way

t r a c k a g e and p r o v i s i o n

common

and

of

their

UTA's

(

passenger

s e r v i c e on t h e Right-of-Way.
. .

NOW,

THEREFORE,

in

consideration

<

of

the

premises,

r e s e r v a t i o n s , covenants and u n d e r t a k i n g s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n , SLS and
XJTA c o v e n a n t and a g r e e a s f o l l o w s :

SECTION 1 .

<

DEFINITIONS

The f o l l o w i n g terms and p h r a s e s s h a l l be d e f i n e d a s

follows

f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement:
f

"Closing Date" shall have the meaning ascribed in the Purchase
Agreement, which is the date the sale of assets from UPRR to DTA is
closed and which closing is to take place, if practical bv December
31, 199 2, but not later than June 1, 1993,

"Coordination Agreement" shall mean this Administration and
Coordination Agreement,
044
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"Easement Agreement" shall mean that certain freight railroad
operating easement and the assignment agreement, concerning rights
and obligations to provide Freight Rail Service,, by and between
UPKR and SLS and dated as of March 31, 1993,

"Freight Easement" shall mean the easement acquired by SLS for
common carrier railftreightoperations on the Right-of-Way pursuant
to the terms of the Easement Agreement.

"Freight Preference Period" shall have the meaning ascribed in
Section 5*4 hereof*

"Freight Rail Service" shall mean the common carrier rail
freight operations to be conducted by SLS on the Right-of-Way*

"Freight Trackage" shall mean .any Joint Trackage and/or
Passenger Trackage, which is designated by UTA to be Freight
Trackage pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof, or any additions to the
existing trackage constructed by SLS on the Right-of-Way after the
Closing Date pursuant^ to Section 4.1 hereof.

"Joint Trackage" shall mean the trackage affixed to the Rightof-Way as of the Closing Date that was included in the Freight
Easement, (described in Exhibit "A" hereto) unless such trackage is
redesignated

pursuant to Section 2*3

hereof, or any Freight

Trackage or Passenger Trackage designated by UTA to be Joint
Trackage pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof.
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1

"Loss or Damage11 shall mean a l l c o s t s , l i a b i l i t i e s , judgments,
fines,

fees (including without limitation reasonable attorneys 1

f e e s and disbursements) and expenses (including without l i m i t a t i o n
defense expenses) of any nature arising from or in connection v i t h
death

of

or injury

to persons,

including without

limitation

employees of the p a r t i e s ; or damage to or destruction of property,
<

i n c l u d i n g the Joint Trackage, the Freight Trackage, the Passenger
Trackage or any property on the Right-of-Way, in connection v i t h
F r e i g h t Rail Service or Passenger Service on the Right-of-Way; or
business losses resulting from or in connection vith an act or
omission giving r i s e to a claim for Loss or Damage.
"Modification

Agreement" shall

mean a written

agreement

between the parties hereto entered into in anticipation of a
Modification.
I

"Modification" or "Modifications" s h a l l mean a l t e r a t i o n s or
a d d i t i o n s t o , or removal of, then-existing trackage on the Rightof-Way, including but not limited to new connections, and changes
in

railroad

commuhication

systems,

signal

or

i

dispatching

facilities.
i
"Passenger Preference Period" shall have the meaning ascribed
in Section 5.4 hereof.
I

UTA0022
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"Passenger

Service"

shall

mean

the

transportation

of

passengers on all or any portion of the Right-of-way, which shall
be provided by UTA or its designee .

"Passenger Trackage" shall mean all segments of trackage
constructed by UTA on the Right-af-Way after the Closing Date
pursuant to Section t:i

or 4-4 hereof, or any Freight Trackage or

Joint Trackage hereafter designated by UTA to be Passenger Trackage
pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof.

"Purchase Agreement" shall mean that certain Purchase and Sale
Agreement by and between UTA and UPRR, dated as of October 30,
1992.

"Right-of-Way" shall mean the following described portions of
the property interests conveyed by UPRR to UTA pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreement: all right-of-way,
trackage, and structures included in or adjacent to the property
described in Parcels No. 1 and 2 of Exhibit "A" to the Purchase
Agreement, including all real property shown and described in the
Haps and other documents regarding the right-of-way which were
included

in Exhibit

fixtures,

"A" to the Purchase Agreement,

tracks, rails, ties,

and

all

switches, crossings, tunnels,

bridges, trestles, culverts, buildings, structures, facilities,
leads,

spurs, turnouts, tails, sidings, team tracks, signals,

crossing protection devices, railroad communications systems, poles
and all other operating appurtenances that are situated: (1) on or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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adjacent to the trackage formerly constituting part of UPSR's Provo
Subdivision Line from the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary
line (approximately UPRR milepost 775*19) to Ninth Street Junction
(which is on the North side of 900 (NINTH) South Street in Salt
Lake City at approximately UPRR milepost 798.74); and (2) on or
adjacent to the trackage formerly constituting UPRR's Lovendahl
Spur, also known aif~the Hidvale Lead, which departs from the
trackage

referenced

above

in

a

southwesterly

direction .at

approximately 6400 (SIXTY-FOOR HUNDRED) South Street in Hurray,
Utah (approximately former UPRR milepost 790*52), crossing under
both 1-15 and the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
("D&RGW") main line, and then heading south to approximately 7400
South, to the point of intersection with the DSRGW right of way, a
distance cf approximately 1*4 miles.

"SLS" shall mean Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co,, Inc.,
a Texas corporation and the Freight Railroad Successor under the
Purchase Agreement.

"UTA" shall mean Utah Transit Authority, a public transit
district organized under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, and its successors or assigns.

SECTION 2.

2.1

FREIGHT RAIL SERVICE; PASSENGER SERVICE

Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Easement

Agreement, SLS shall have the exclusive right and obligation to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

provide Freight Rail Service on the Freight Trackage and the Joint
Trackage.

SLS shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and

shall net conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on
the Passenger Trackage or any other activity whatsoever on the
Right-of-way that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service.

DTA

shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not
conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Rightof-Way.

2.2

OTA

shall have the exclusive right to conduct, by

itself or through OTA's designee or otherwise, Passenger Service on
the Right-of-way.

SLS shall have no right or obligation to

conduct, and shall not conduct, directly or indirectly, Passenger
Service on the Right-of-Way; provided, however, that OTA and SLS
may arrange, under a separate written agreement, for SLS to perform
certain services on behalf of OTA with_ respect to the Passenger
Service.

2.3 OTA may from time to time, upon 3 0 days written notice to
SLS, change any track designation
Trackage

or Joint Trackage) to

(Freight Trackage, Passenger
any other track designation;

provided, however that no such change in track designation shall
unreasonably

interfere with SLS's Freight Rail Service on the

Right-of-Way; provided, further, that the parties may agree to
immediate track redesignations to respond to emergencies or the
needs of the parties. OTA may not designate trackage as Freight
Trackage without the written consent of SLS if such trackage is (1)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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then being used for Passenger Service, cr (2) then not being used
for Freight Rail Service-

In order to ensure safe, economical and

reliable Freight Rail Service and Passenger Service on the Rightof-way, the paxties shall establish a Coordination Committee*

The

Coordination Committee will convene to resolve those administrative
and coordination matters designated for Coordination Committee
resolution by the terms of this Coordination Agreement as well as
any other matters, upon agreement of the parties• The Coordination
Committee shall be composed of two representatives from each party.
The chief executive officer of each of SLS and UTA also shall be ex
officio members of the Coordination Committee.

SECTION 3 .

3.1

MAINTENANCE: ALTERATIONS

SLS shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and

renewal of the Freight Trackage and shall maintain, repair and
renew the same to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail
Service; provided that SLS shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair
and renew the Freight Trackage so as to preserve the present
condition of track, grade crossings and signal facilities, as
described on Exhibit
expenses

of

Trackage.

,! n

B hereto-

maintenance, repair

SLS shall bear all costs and
and

renewal

of

the

Freight

Nothing herein shall relieve SLS of the obligation to

perform maintenance, repair and renewal on the Freight Trackage in
a

good

and

workman-like manner

and

in compliance

applicable laws and regulations,
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3.2

UTA s h a l l be responsible f o r t h e maintenance, r e p a i r and

r e n e w a l of t h e Passenger Trackage and s h a l l maintain, r e p a i r and
renew t h e same t o the standards i t deems necessary for Passenger
S e r v i c e ; UTA s h a l l bear a l l c o s t s and expenses of maintenance,
r e p a i r and renewal of the Passenger Trackage.

3.3

Subject

t o Sections

3.4

and

10.2,

SLS s h a l l

be

r e s p o n s i b l e for and s h a l l pay t h e c o s t s of t h e maintenance, r e p a i r
and r e n e w a l of the J o i n t Trackage and s h a l l maintain, r e p a i r and
renew t h e same t o the standards i t deems necessary for Freight R a i l
S e r v i c e ; provided t h a t SLS s h a l l , a t a minimum, maintain,
and

renew

condition

t h e J o i n t Trackage
of t r a c k ,

so as

grade crossings

d e s c r i b e d on Exhibit "B" hereto.

to

preserve

and s i g n a l

repair

the present •

facilities,

as

Nothing h e r e i n s h a l l r e l i e v e SLS

of t h e o b l i g a t i o n to perform maintenance, r e p a i r and renewal on t h e
J o i n t Trackage in a good and workman-like manner and in compliance
w i t h a l l a p p l i c a b l e lavs and r e g u l a t i o n s .

3.4
sixty

Upon written notice t o SLS a t any time, but a t

least

(60) days prior to commencement of Passenger Service, UTA

s h a l l undertake and assume a l l c o s t s of maintenance, r e p a i r and
r e n e w a l of t h e J o i n t Trackage.

Upon assumption of maintenance,

repair

and renewal of the J o i n t Trackage,

repair

and renew the Joint Trackage t o t h e standards i t deems

necessary

UTA s h a l l

maintain,

for Passenger Service; provided t h a t UTA s h a l l ,

at a

minimum, maintain, repair and renew t h e J o i n t Trackage so as t o
p r e s e r v e t h e t r a c k t o FRA Class I t r a c k and grade crossings and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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signal facilities to their then current condition.

SLS hereby

acknowledges that the present condition of track and signal
facilities is sufficient for its Freight Rail Service.
fails

If UTA

to maintain, repair and renew the Joint Trackage in

accordance with the standard set forth above, SLS shall have the
right to maintain, repair and renew the Joint Trackage to the
standard necessary to "fulfill its rail carrier obligations.

SECTION 4.

4^2

CONSTRUCTION ? MODIFICATIONS

If SLS reasonably determines that Modifications are

reouired to accommodate its Freight Rail Service over the Freight
Trackage or the Joint Trackage, SLS shall bear all expenses in
connection with such Modifications, including without limitation
the annual expense (for so long as such Modifications are a part of
the Freight Trackage or the Joint Trackage) of maintaining,
repairing, inspecting, and renewing such Modifications, including
any increased operating costs associated with Passenger Service.
SLS shall not commence construction or other work in connection
with such Modifications to the Joint Trackage or the Freight
Trackage without entering into a Modification Agreement with UTA
and obtaining UTA's written consent. The parties shall, through
the Coordination Committee, negotiate in good faith to enter into
a Modification Agreement for SLS's Modifications to the Joint
Trackage or the Freight Trackage necessary for Freight Rail
o

Service, but such Modifications shall not interfere with or impede
Passenger Service over the Right-of-way. All Modifications made by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SLS to the Freight Trackage or the Joint Trackage within the Rightof-way shall become the property of UTA.

4.2

UTA plans to construct additional trackage (which, in the

absence of some other designation, shall initially be deemed to be
Passenger Trackage) on the Right-of-Way so that, through usage of
existing

and

such

additional

trackage,

the Right-of-way

may

accommodate Freight Rail Service and Passenger Service. UTA shall
have the right to construct such additional trackage as it deems
r*scessary; provided, however, that no such construction shall
unreasonably interfere with SLSfs Freight Rail Service on the
Right-of-Way but that SLS shall reasonably cooperate with UTA so as
to allow for the construction of additional trackage on the Rightof-Way,

UTA and SLS, through the Coordination Committee, shall

cooperate to secure (from a third party independent contractor)
temporary substitute service during construction or modification
periods; the cost of substitute service to freight customers during
construction or modification periods shall not be borne by SLS.
UTA

shall

trackage

be responsible for the construction

of additional

for Passenger Service on the Right-of-Way and shall

construct

the

same to the standards

it

deems necessary

for

Passenger

Service; UTA shall bear^ all costs and exmenses of

construction of such additional trackage.

4.3

UTA shall have the right, upon 3 0 days written notice to

SLS, to realign the Freight Trackage, the Passenger Trackage or the
Joint Trackage on the Right-of-Way; provided, however, that no such
_.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

_

--

053

TTHTAnmQ

realignment shall unreasonably interfere vith SLS's Freight Rail
Service but that SLS shall.reasonably cooperate with UTA so as to
allow for such realignment.

4-4

If

DTA

determines

that

Modifications

Trackage

or

the

Passenger

required

to accommodate its Passenger Service over the Joint

Trackage

(after

to

the

Joint

construction)

are

Trackage or the Passenger Trackage, DTA shall bear all expenses in
connection with construction of additional, bettered, or altered
facilities, including without limitation the annual expense (for so
long as such additional, bettered, or altered facilities are a part
of the Joint Trackage or the Passenger Trackage) of maintaining,
repairing, inspecting, and renewing such additional or altered
facilities.

All additions, alterations and improvements made by

UTA to the Joint Trackage or the Passenger Trackage shall become
'the property of UTA.

4.5
.hereof,
Trackage

Excluding only (i) construction under Section 4.2 and 4.3
(ii) ordinary maintenance and repair work on the Joint
(if UTA is ^maintaining the Joint Trackage pursuant to

Section 3.4) and (iii) emergency work required for immediate safety
reasons, UTA shall notify SLS in writing of any proposed work on
the Joint Trackage and shall submit plans on any Modifications
thereto.

The parties, through the Coordination Committee, shall

cooperate in good faith to ensure that such Modifications do not
unreasonably interfere with or impede Freight Rail Service over the

Right-of-way.
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SECTION 5-

5.1

OPERATIONS

DTA s h a l l have e x c l u s i v e a u t h o r i t y t o manage, d i r e c t and

c o n t r o l a l l a c t i v i t i e s on the Passenger Trackage.

exclusive

authority

to

control

operations

of

DTA s h a l l have

all

trains

l o c o m o t i v e s , r a i l cars and r a i l equipment and the movement and
speed of the same on the Passenger Trackage.

SLS s h a l l not have

any r i g h t to operate on the Passenger Trackage.

5.2

SLS s h a l l have exclusive authority t o manage, direct and

c o n t r o l a l l railroad and railroad-related operations on the Freight
Trackage.

SLS s h a l l have exclusive authority t o control operations

of a l l t r a i n s , locomotives, railcars and r a i l equipment and the
movement and speed of the same on the Freight Trackage.

DTA s h a l l

not have any right to operate on trackage then designated as
F r e i g h t Trackage.

5.3

Except as s e t forth in Sections 5 . 4 - 5 . 7 ,

the t r a i n s ,

l o c o m o t i v e s , r a i l cars and r a i l equipment of e i t h e r party may be
operated on the Joint Trackage without prejudice or p a r t i a l i t y and
in

such

a manner as w i l l result

in the most economical and

e f f i c i e n t movement of a l l traffic.

5.4

In order to ensure safe, economical and r e l i a b l e Freight

R a i l Service and Passenger Service, the p a r t i e s hereby establish
(i)

a Freight Preference Period for the Right-of-Way between the ,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hours of 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m., Monday through Friday,
inclusive, and (ii) a Passenger Preference Period for the Right-ofWay betveen the hours of 5:01 a.m. and 11:59 p.m., Monday through
Friday, inclusive, and all Saturday and Sunday. SLS has inspected
the Right-of-Way and reviewed the records of UFRR pertaining to
Freight

Rail

Service

on

the

Right-of-Way.

Based

on

such

investigation and review, SLS has determined that it can provide
Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference Period.'
SLS

agrees to employ such equipment and employees necessary to

provide Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference
The Coordination Committee shall, at either party1 s

Period.

request, meet to negotiate in good faith regarding proposed changes
to the Freight Preference Period and the Passenger Preference
Period.

5.5

During the Freight Preference Period, UTA shall not be

authorized to operate trains or conduct Passenger Service on the
Joint

Trackage

or

the

Passenger

permission from the dispatcher.

Trackage,

without

special

During the Passenger Preference

Period, SLS shall not be authorized to operate trains or conduct
Freight Rail Service on the Joint Trackage or the Freight Trackage,
without special permission from the dispatcher.

5.6

During the Freight Preference Period, SLS shall manage,

direct: and control, at SLS's sole expense, all activities on the
Joint Trackage.
control

all

During such period, SLS shall manage, direct and

freight

railroad

and

freight

railroad-related
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operations on the Joint Trackage and shall direct dispatching and
control the entry and exit of all trains, locomotives, rail cars
and rail equipment and the movement and speed of the same on the
Joint Trackage and the Freight Trackage.

5.7 During the Passenger Preference Period, DTA shall manage,
direct and control,-at UTA's sole expense, all activities on the '
Joint Trackage. During such period, DTA shall manage, direct and
control all activities on the Joint Trackage and shall direct
dispatching

and

control

the

entry

and

exit

of

all trains,

locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment and the movement and
speed of the same on the Joint Trackage and the Passenger Trackage.

5.8

SLS shall pay all taxes, assessments, fees, charges,

costs and expenses related solely to Freight Pail Service on the
Right-of-way or ownership of the Freight Easement.

UTA shall pay

all taxes, assessments, fees, charges, costs and expenses related
solely

to

thereof.

passenger Service on the Right-of-Way or ownership
The parties shall negotiate in good faith to allocate

assessments, fees, charges, costs and expenses related'to the Joint
Trackage or shared use of the Right-of-Way; provided however, that
nothing in this Section 5.8 shall be construed to require SLS to
pay real estate or ad valorem taxes; provided further, that nothing
in this section 5.8 shall be construed to require either party to
pay real estate or ad valorem taxes assessed against the other
party,

UTA0033
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SECTION 6.

6.1

CLEANING OF OBSTRUCTIONS. DERAILMENTS AND WRECKS

If by reason of any mechanical failure or for any other

cause not resulting from an accident or derailment, any train
locomotive, rail car or rail equipment of SLS becomes stalled or
unable to proceed under its ovn power or unable to maintain prcoer
speed on the Right-of-Way or if, in an emergency, crippled or
otherwise defective cars are set out of a SLS train on the Richtof-Way, then UTA shall have the option to furnish motive Dower or
such other assistance as may be necessary to haul, helm, or push
such train, locomotive, car or equipment, or to prooerlv move the
disabled equipment off the Right-of-Way, and SLS shall reimburse
UTA for the reasonable and necessary cost of renderinc anv such
assistance.

6-2

In the event of any derailment or wreck of a SLS train,

SLS shall clear the Right-of-Way of all obstructions within a
reasonable time*

SLS also shall perform any rerailing or wreckinc

train service as may be required in connection with such derailment
or wreck, in accordance with industry practices. In the event that
SLS

does not clear the Right-of-Way of obstructions within a

reasonable time, UTA may clear the Right-of-Way of obstructions and
SLS shall reimburse DTA for all reasonable and necessary costs
incurred in performing such service.

UTA0034
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SECTION 7.

7.1

ALLOOTTng nr r . T . p ^ j - .

Beth

•BPU-H.

parties

federal

,

«.t.

s l l a l l
M d

a a d r t t t

l o o I 1

l a v s

.
^

^

^

^

r e g u i a t i o

^

^

a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s , r e g u l a t i o n s or o r d e r s n r ^ m ^
r c r e e p s promulgated by any c o u r t
a g e n c y , m u n i c i p a l i t y , board or commission
T,
n
I f
an
^...
„,.
'
y f a i l u r e of
e i t h e r p a r t y t o comply with such l a w s , r u l e s , r e g u l a t i o n s or orders
«
r e s p e c t t o the use of t h e Hight-of-Way r e s u l t s in any f i n e
p e n a l t y , c o s t or charge being a s s e s s e d a c aiinnssrt the
the „*„
' '
other p a r t y , or
«U" L o s s or D M a g e , tte p a r t y w M c h f a . l e d ^ c o a D i y
***«.. p W y
^ ^
^
^
M d indeanify, protect< defena ^
t h e o t h e r Party for such amount.

7.2

Notwithstanding

(i)

anythinc e l s e c o n f a b - •
e
co
"
n t a x n e a xn t h i s
C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement or ( i i ) o t h e r w i s e a m i c a b l e 1
*PP-ucal>le law r e g a r d i n g
a l l o c a t i o n of l i a b i l i t y based on f a u l t or otherwise « , *
^ e ^ w x s e , as between t h e
P a ^ x e s h e r e t o l i a b i l i t y f o r Loss or Damaae r e s u l t s
,
9e
r e s u l t x n g from o r i*n
c o n n e c t i o n with the maintenance, c o n s t r u c t i o n
.
' c o n s r r u c * i o n , o p e r a t i o n s or o t h e r
a c t s o r omissions of e i t h e r p a r t y s h a n h- u
P
Y S2uul be b o
.
^ and p a i d by t h e
p a r t x e s as follows:
(a)
When such Loss or Damace r e s u l t s <v„
- . . - e s u x t s .rom o r a r i s e s i n
c o n n e c t i o n with the maintenance, c o n s t r u c t i o n
ons
^ r u c t i o n , o p e r a t i o n s or
o t n e r a c t s or omissions of o n l y one of t h e Da>—•»
une p a r t x e s , r e c a r d l e s s
or any third party involvement, such
r
n«
Cn L o s s o r
'
Damage s h a l l be
borne by that party; and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UTA0035

I

(b)

When such Loss or Damage results from cr arises in

connection with the acts or omissions of both parties, or of
third parties, or from unknown causes, Acts of God, or any
other cause whatsoever, such liability shall be borne by the
party or parties responsible under applicable lav.

7.3

Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage

the risk of which it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court
to the contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability
notwithstanding, and will forever indemnify, protect, defend and
hold harmless the other party, its successors and assigns, from
such payment.

7.4

In the event that both parties hereto shall be liable

under this Coordination Agreement for any claim, demand, suit or
cause of action, and the same shall be compromised and settled by
voluntary payment of money or valuable consideration by one of the
parties, release from liability will be taken in the name of both
parties and all of each party's officers, agents, and employees.
Neither party shall make any such compromise or settlement in
excess of $25,000 without prior, written authority of the other
party having liability, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld, but any settlement made by one party in consideration of
$25,000 or less shall be a settlement releasing all liabilitv of
both parties and shall be binding upon both parties.

060
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7.5

m

case a lawsuit or lawsuits shall be commenced against

either party hereto for or on account of any Loss or Damage for
which the other party may be solely or jointly liable under this
Coordination Agreement, the party thus sued shall give the other
party timely written notice of the 'pendency of such suit, and
thereupon the party so notified may assume or join in the defense
thereof, and if the-party so notified is liable therefor under this
Coordination Agreement, to the extent of such liability, such party
shall defend, indemnify and save harmless the party so sued from
all Loss or Damage in accordance with the liability allocation set
forth in this coordination Agreement. Neither party shall be bound
by any judgment against the other party unless it shall have been
so notified and shall have had reasonable opportunity to assume or
join in the defense of the action.

When so notified, and said

opportunity to assume or join in the defense of the action has been
afforded,

the party so notified shall to the extent of its

liability

under this Coordination Agreement be bound by such

j udgment.

7.6

Nothing in .this Section 7 shall be construed as a waiver

by DTA of any immunity, pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Code
Annotated

1953, as amended, or applied

so as to effectively

constitute such waiver.

UTA0037
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SECTION 8-

8.1

T™*; TTOKTNATION

This Coordination Agreement s h a l l

terminate upon

the

Termination of t h i s Coordination Agreement s h a l l

net

t e r m i n a t i o n of the Freight Easement-

8.2

r e l i e v e e i t h e r party, of t h e i r obligations or l i a b i l i t i e s

to t h e

o t h e r p a r t y arising prior to such termination.

SECTION 9.

COMPLIANCE WTTK LAWS

UTA. a n d SLS s h a l l comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of a l l a p p l i c a b l e
laws, regulations, and rules respecting the operation,
inspection,
cars

and safety of their respective t r a i n s ,

condition,

locomotives,

and other equipment operated over the Right-of-Way.

Each

par-ty s h a l l indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the other,
its

affiliates,

and any of i t s directors,

officers,

agents and

employees from and against a l l fines, p e n a l t i e s , and l i a b i l i t i e s
imposed

upon the other party,

directors,
and

officers,

regulations

by

its

affiliates

or

any

of

agents, or employees under such laws,
any

public

authority

or

coum

its
rules

having

j u r i s d i c t i o n , when attributable to i t s f a i l u r e to comply with the
p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s section.

UTA0038
062
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SECTION 10.

10.1

CASUALTY LOSSES

In the event that any portion of the Right-cf-Way that

is being used by UTA for the continued provision of Passenger
Service is damaged or destroyed by flood, fire, civil disturbance,
earthquake, storm, ""sabotage or act of God, or accidents

or

. vandalism caused by third parties or for which the cause is
unknown, then, UTA may either (i) repair, or cause to be repaired,
that portion of the Right-of-way so damaged or destroyed to
substantially the same condition as existed prior to such damage or
destruction, or (ii) replace, or cause to be replaced, such portion
with property of like kind, condition or quality.

The cost and

expense of such repair or replacement shall be borne by UTA.

10.2

In the event that any portion of the Right-of-way that

is being used by SLS for the continued provision of Freight Rail
Service, and which is not also being used for Passenger Service, is
damaged or destroyed by flood, fire, civil disturbance, earthquake,
storm, sabotage or act of God, or accidents or vandalism caused by
third parties or for which the cause is unknown, then, SLS may
either (i) repair, or cause to be repaired, that portion of the
Right-of-way so damaged or destroyed to substantially the same
condition as existed prior to such damage or destruction, or (ii)
replace, or cause to be replaced, such portion with property of
like kind, condition or quality.

The cost and expense of such

repair or replacement shall be borne" by SLS; provided, however,
_

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

..

n<r-,

TTTAHA'Jn

that SLS shall not be obligated under this Section 10.2 to repair
or replace the damaged or destroyed portion of the Right-of-Way if
in SLSf s good faith judgment the cost thereof would be excessive or
unreasonable taking into account the profitability of SLS l s freight
operations on the Right-of-Way, unless UTA shall agree to reimburse
SLS for such cost.

10.3

Except when subject to Section 7, in the event .any

portion of the Right-of-Way is damaged or destroyed by accidents
caused by either party or vandalism by the employees or agents of
either party, and the party that caused the accident or whose
employees or agents caused the vandalism shall bear the cost and
expense thereof.

SECTION 11.

11.1

COMPENSATION

Except as otherwise specifically provided

in this

Coordination Agreement, SLS and UTA shall have no obligation to pay
or

otherwise

compensate

each

other

in

connection

with

this

Coordination Agreement.

11.2

Any payments due and payable by SLS or UTA under this

Coordination Agreement shall be paid within forty-five (45) days
after receipt of an invoice therefor, by check delivered to the
address of the payee as set forth in Section 13.4 hereof; provided,
however, that in the event of a good faith dispute relating to any
such payment, the disputed portion of the invoice shall be paid,

..;...._
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with f u l l

reservation

of r i g h t s

t o p o s s i b l e reimbursement

upon

r e s o l u t i o n of such d i s p u t e . Any payments not made v i t h i n f o r t h - f i v e
(45)

days of an i n v o i c e t h e r e f o r s h a l l t h e r e a f t e r be s u b j e c t

to

i n t e r e s t c h a r g e s , which s h a l l accrue a t t h e h i g h e s t lawful r a t e f o r
t h e f o r b e a r a n c e of money.

11.3

Upon r e q u e s t ,

a p a r t y d i s p u t i n g the accuracy of

any

i n v o i c e s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e from.the b i l l i n g party c o p i e s
o f s u c h s u p p o r t i n g documentation and/or r e c o r d s as are keot i n t h e
ordinary

course

reasonably

of

necessary

the b i l l i n g party's
to verify

business

and which

the accuracy of the

invoice

are
as

rendered.

SECTION 1 2 .

INSURANCE

SLS, a t i t s s o l e c o s t and expense, s h a l l procure or c a u s e t o
be procured and maintain or cause t o be maintained during

the

c o n t i n u a n c e of t h i s Coordination Agreement, r a i l r o a d o p e r a t i n g and
liability

insurance c o v e r i n g l i a b i l i t y assumed by SLS under t h i s

C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement with a l i m i t of n o t l e s s than Twenty-Five
M i l l i o n Dollars

($25,000,000)

combined s i n g l e l i m i t for

personal

i n j u r y and property damage per occurrence, with d e d u c t i b l e or s e l f
insurance

not g r e a t e r than F i f t y Thousand D o l l a r s

($50,000.00).

SLS s h a l l f u r n i s h t o DTA c e r t i f i c a t e s of insurance e v i d e n c i n g t h e
above coverage i n t h e form of a p o l i c y (or p o l i c i e s ) a t t h e time of
execution

of t h i s Coordination Agreement.

Such insurance

shall

c o n t a i n a c o n t r a c t u a l l i a b i l i t y endorsement which w i l l c o v e r t h e
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obligations

assumed under this Coordination Agreement

and

an

endorsement naming CTA as "additional insured." In addition, such
insurance

shall

contain

notification

provisions

whereby

the

insurance company agrees to give thirty (30) days' written notice
to the UTA of any change in or cancellation of the policy. All of
these endorsements and notice provisions shall be stated on the
certificate of insurance which is to be provided to UTA.

SECTION 13.

13.1
referenced

GENERAL PROVISIONS

This

Coordination

Agreement

and

the

agreements

herein constitute the entire agreement between the

parties hereto with respect to the subject matter contained herein
and

there

are

no

agreements,

understandings,

restrictions,

warranties or representations between the parties other than those
set forth or provided for herein. All Exhibits attached hereto are
hereby

incorporated by reference into, and made part of, this

Coordination Agreement.

13.2 This Coordination Agreement may not be amended except by
an instrument in writing signed by the parties hereto.

13.3

Waiver of any provision of this Coordination Agreement,

in whole or in part, can be made only by an agreement in writing
signed by the parties and such waiver in any one instance shall not
constitute a waiver of any other provision in the same instance,
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nor any waiver of the same provision in another instance, but each
provision shall continue in full force and effect with respect to
any other then existing or subsequent breach.

13.4 A notice or demand to be given by one party to the other
shall be given in writing by personal service, telegram, express
mail, Federal Express", DEL or any other similar form of courier or
delivery service, or mailing in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, certified, return receipt requested and addressed to such
party as follows:
(a)

In the case of a notice or communication to the UTA

Attention: General Hanager, P. 0. Box 30810, Salt Lake City, Utah
S4130-0810, with a copy to William D. Oswald, Attorney for the
Purchaser, 201 South Main Street, 12th Floor, Lake City, Utah,
84111.
(b) In the case of a notice or communication to SLS addressed
to the principal office of SLS, Attention:

General Manager, Carl

Hollowell, P. 0. Box 57366, Murray, UT 84157, with a copy to the
President of RailTex Services, Inc., 4040 Broadway, Suite 200, San
Antonio, TX

78209 or addressed in such other way in respect to

either party as that party may, from time to time, designate in
writing dispatched as provided in this Section.

All notices,

demands, requests, and other communications under this Agreement
shall be in writing and shall be deemed properly served and to have
been

duly

given

(i) on the date of delivery,

if

delivered

personally on the party to whom notice is given, or if made by
telecopy directed to the party to whoa notice is to be given at the
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t e l e c o p y number listed below, or ( i i ) an r e c e i p t , if mailed to the
pax-ty t o whom notice is to be given by registered or c e r t i f i e d
mail,

return receipt requested,

postage

prepaid and proDerly

addressed.
13,5 If any provision of t h i s Coordination Agreement shall be
held c r be deemed to- be or s h a l l , in f a c t , be i l l e g a l , invalid,
i n o p e r a t i v e or unenforceable as applied i n any particular case in
any j u r i s d i c t i o n or jurisdictions or in a l l j u r i s d i c t i o n s of in a l l
cases because i t conflicts with any other provision or provisions
hereof or any constitution or s t a t u t e or r u l e of lav or public
p o l i c y , or for amy other reason, such circumstances shall not have
t h e e f f e c t of rendering the provision in question inoperative or
unenforceable in any other case or circumstance or of rendering anv
o t h e r provision or provisions herein contained i l l e g a l , invalid,
inoperative,
invalidity
sections

or unenforceable

to

any

of any one or more phrases,

extent

whatever.

The'

sentences, clauses or

of t h i s Coordination Agreement s h a l l not affect

the

remaining portions of this Coordination Agreement or any part
thereof.

13.6

This Coordination Agreement: (i) contains headings only

for convenience, which headings do not form p a r t of and shall not
be used in construction; and (ii) i s nor intended to inure to the
b e n e f i t of any person or entity not a p a r t y ,

UTA0044
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13.7

All of the terms and provisions of t h i s Coordination

Agreement s h a l l be binding upon and inure t o the benefit of, and be
e n f o r c e a b l e by, the parties hereto and t h e i r respective successors
and permitted assigns.

Except to a corporate parent, subsidiary or

o t h e r a f f i l i a t e , SLS may not assign i t s r i g h t s or obligations under
t h i s Coordination Agreement.

13.S

This

Coordination

Agreement

may _ be • executed

in

c o u n t e r p a r t s , each of which .shall be considered an o r i g i n a l , but
all

of

which together shall

constitute

but one and the

same

instrument.

13.9

This Coordination Agreement s h a l l be governed by and

construed under the laws of the State of Utah, including c o n f l i c t
of l a v s p r i n c i p l e s .

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties

hereto have caused

this

Coordination Agreement to be executed as a sealed instrument as of
the

date

first

representatives.

WITNESS:

set

forth

above

by

their
•

authorized

'

SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN
RAILROAD CO.,-INC.

Title: ,

3/29/93

duly

.p
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UTAH TRANSIT ADTEORITY

Bv:

Title '.ydi^^/ -77U~<*^i_
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EXHIBIT "A"
DESCRIPTION OF TRACKAGE SUBJECT TO SLS'S FREIGHT EASEMENT
UP's freight railroad line located between Ninth Street
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOOTH STREET,
Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 798.74) and
the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary line
(approximately
milepost
775.19)
consisting
of
approximately 23,55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief
Engineer's Alignment Haps of the Union Pacific Provo
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Short line
Railroad Station Maps - Lands a3ca Property Accounting
Valuation Haps;
UP's spur freight railroad line which departs in a
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line
at
approximately
6400
South
in
Hurray,
Utah
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the
1-15 freeway and the DSRGW Railroad main line, and then
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point
of
intersection with the DSRGW right
of way
(approximately milepost 1.402), a distance of about 1.4
miles, as shown on the UP!s Chief Engineer's Alignment
Haps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Haps Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Haps;
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to
UTA located in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which
extends from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the
UPRR Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to
19 0 East; the east-west ' width "of this property is
approximately 260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a
small portion on the north end which is narrower, and its
length from north to south is approximately 2560 feet;
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to
UTA situated between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 West
and which is approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide.
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM TEE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED
PARCELS OF PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OR SUBJECT TO
THE FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT:
SEE THE DESCRIPTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES

UTA0047
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(Exhibit "A" coacinued)

A piece of
quarter of
"quarter of
West, Salt

land one hundred (100) fest wide, situate in the Southwest
the Northeast quarter, and the Northwest quarter of the Southeast
Section Thirteen (13), Township Two (2) South, Range.One (1)
Lake Meridian, and more fully described as follows, to-wit:

Beginning at a point on the East and West center line of said Section
Thirteen (13), seyen hundred forty-nine and one tenth (749.1) feet East from
the center of said section, said point being fifty (50) fest East along said
center line of said section from where i t is Intersected by the canter line
of the main track of the Oreoon Short Line Railroad; thence North no degrees
and thirty minutes (0*30') East, on a line parallel with said center line of
main track and fifty (50) fest distant therefrom at right angles, six
hundred fifteen and twelve-hundredths (615.12) feet, thence North eighty-one
dearess and fifty minutes (ai'SO'JEast, one hundred one and fifteen
hundredths (101.15) fest; thence South no degrees and thirty minutes
(Q°3CI)West, eight hundred sixty-two and seventy-three hundredths (862-/J)
f e s t ; thence North eighty-nine degress and thirty minutes (89*30') West one
hundred (100) feet to a point fifty (50) feet Easterly from aforesaid center
line of main track of the Oregon Short Line Railroad; thence North no
depress and thirty minutes (0°30') East two hundred thirty-three and
sixty-Mght hundredths (233.68) feet to the place of beginning.

A strip of land 100 feet wide, in the Northeast 1/4 OT Section la, T.2S.,
R.1W., Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying Easter and adjacent to the
present right of way of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company. Said strip
being more particularly described as TOIIOWS:
Beginning at a point 1854 feet, more or less West and 311 feet more or n
l e s s , SoGth of the Northeast corner of said Section 13. said g " £ b « n g °
the East riaht of way line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad 50 feet from
•the center Tine of Its main line, and at the Southwest corner of the
American Smelting and Refining Company's property; thence South 0 30 W.,
parallel to said center line, 1691.8 feet; thence North 81° E. along the
South side of John Berger's land, 101.4_fest; thence North 0»30E parallel
to and 150 feet from said center line OT Oregon Snort Line mam line, IBS/,
fest; thence South 83°30W. 100.8 feet to the place of beginning.
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(Exhibit "A" continued)

Tne following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot three (3),and part
of the Southeast quarter of the Northest quarter of Section Six (6), in
Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian.
Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) rods East from the Horthwest corner of said
lot three; thence East nineteen 40/100 rods; thence South one hundred and
sixty (150) rods; thence West nineteen 40/100 rods; thence West one hundred
and sixty (150) rods to the place of beginning.
Less and excepting the followi-ng parcels of. property, which are included vith:
Che Retained Freight Operating Easeaent:

"*

1- That portion within the bonnes of the cristinc sincle
line through track which is approximately 66 feet in width."
2. That portion of the land lying between the sincle line
"through track and 14 f est East and aborting the canter line of
the Easuerly nest track of the existing siding track situated in
Lets 40, A3, and 62, Sandy Station Plat.
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EXHIBIT "B"
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT CONDITION OF TRACK, GRADE CROSSINGS
AND SIGNAL FACILITIES REGARDING THE PROPERTY AS OF CLOSING

TRACK:
The e n t i r e t y of the main track r a i l s on the Property are 133 pound
r a i l s (133 pounds per yard) and are in good condition.
&~

The main t r a c k on t h e Property between t h e S a l t Lake County/Utah
County boundary l i n e and north of t h e n o r t h end of P a l l a s Yard, a t
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5330 South, Murray, Utah i s FRA Class I I I b e c a u s e o f
t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e r a i l r o a d t i e s .
The main t r a c k between approximately 5330 South, Murray, Utah, and
N i n t h S t r e e t J u n c t i o n , approximately 3 00 f e e t north of t h e n o r t h
s i d e o f 900 South S t r e e t i n S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah i s g e n e r a l l y FRA
C l a s s I I I b u t w i t h s e v e r a l areas t h a t are o n l y FRA Class I I b e c a u s e
o f t h e c o n d i t i o n of r a i l r o a d t i e s and o c c a s i o n a l i n s u f f i c i e n t
cross levelling,
A l l s p u r t r a c k s , team t r a c k s and yard t r a c k s on t h e
i n c l u d i n g t h e t r a c k s a t P a l l a s Yard, are FRA Class I .

Property,

SIGNAL FACILITIES:
A l l o f t h e s i g n a l f a c i l i t i e s regarding t h e Property a r e i n g o o d
working condition.
GRADE CROSSINGS:
A l l o f t h e grade c r o s s i n g s
condition.

regarding t h e Property a r e i n

good
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ACTION OF VEHICLES
BUS
O

#2
D

D

STOPPED

a

o

a

STOPPING

D

D

a

D

D

Q

O
0

D

BUS #2 #3
a
a
a

#3

D
D

Q

(MARK ALL SQUARES THAT APPLY)
TURNING LEFT

BUS

TRAFFIC CONTRC

a

APPROACHING STOP

a

NONE

•

AT STOP

D

TRAFFIC SIGNAL

4

" a

a

a TURNING RIGHT

STARTING

O

D

D

GOING STRAIGHT

0

LEAVING STOP

D

POLICE OFFICER

CHANGING LANES

D

D

D

CROSSING INTERSECTION

D

EOL

a

STOP SIGN

MOVING TO CURB

j

a
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D

YIELD

0

OTHER
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OTHER

MOVING FROM CURB

SNOWY

ROAD CONDITIONS
a WET

VISIBILITY
a
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a

a

OVERCAST

a

RAIN

D

DRY

•

DAWN

a

FOG

a

ICE / SNOW

D
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a

OTHER

a

DISREPAIR*-

Q

DARK

WHERE DID YOU FIRST NOTICE THE OTHER VEHICLE
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT
a
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D

REAR

0

a

LEFT SIDE

D

ON CROSS STREET

0

IN INTERSECTION (

D

RIGHT SIDE

O

POINT OF IMPACT
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OTHER

IN DRIVEWAY
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